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FOREWORD
This volume on the Arctic is the last volume in
the set of five based on the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI)-U.S. State Department conference on Russia
held in January 2010. The Arctic’s importance to the
United States and to the international community has
grown by virtue of its enormous energy holdings and
the prospect of increased year-round navigation due
to climate change. Given its proximity to Russia and
that country’s dependence on energy for its economic
growth and development, this area’s importance to
Russia has grown, leading Moscow to make aggressive claims on behalf of its Arctic interests.
Russia’s claims have triggered considerable anxiety among other Arctic states. These considerations
oblige analysts here and abroad to take regional developments in the Arctic quite seriously. Therefore,
we are making these papers, which reflect Russian,
American, and European analyses of the motives, capabilities, and interests of Russia in the Arctic, available to our readers so that they can benefit from the
authors’ expert insights.
		

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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INTRODUCTION
Due to changes in climate and technology, the Arctic Ocean is becoming increasingly navigable. Since
potentially enormous energy holdings have been
discovered there, and the Arctic constitutes Russia’s
northern coast, the area’s commercial significance
adds to its preexisting strategic importance for the Russian Federation. During the Cold War, the High North
theater held acute strategic significance as the bastion
for Russia’s nuclear Northern Fleet. That significance,
though diminished, still prevails. The Pacific side of
the Arctic is becoming more important as China’s
power grows. The mounting importance of the area as
a source of energy and trade for Russia merely adds
to the Chinese factor. Bearing these points in mind,
beginning in 2007 the Russian government has made
a noisy and demonstrative effort to assert its claims
in the Arctic but has also negotiated with other Arctic
stakeholders, most prominently Norway, with whom
it signed a treaty in 2010.
Given the growing strategic significance of the
Arctic for Russia and other Arctic states like the United States, the Strategic Studies Institute added a panel
on the Arctic to its January 2010 conference, “Contemporary issues in International Security,” held at the
Finnish embassy in Washington, DC. The papers in
the present volume bring together Russian, European,
and American analyses of the energy and military significance of the Arctic, a significance extending to the
United States and other Arctic states, as well to Russia. These papers clarify the motives, stakes, and capabilities that Russia brings to the Arctic, thus their true
importance lies in their implications for international
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security. Therefore they should help to advance our
understanding of a region whose significance for the
United States in terms of both energy and strategy will
rise considerably in the foreseeable future.

viii

CHAPTER 1
RUSSIA IN THE ARCTIC:
CHALLENGES TO U.S. ENERGY
AND GEOPOLITICS IN THE HIGH NORTH
Ariel Cohen
The Arctic has reemerged as a strategic area where
vital U.S. interests are at stake. The geopolitical and
geo-economic importance of the Arctic region is immense, as its mineral wealth is likely to turn the region
into a booming economic frontier in the 21st century.
The Arctic coasts and continental shelf are estimated
to hold large deposits of oil, natural gas, methane hydrate (natural gas) clusters, and large quantities of
valuable minerals.
With the shrinking of the polar ice cap, navigation
through the Northwest Passage along the northern
coast of North America may become increasingly possible with the help of icebreakers. Similarly, Russia
is seeking to make the Northern Sea Route along the
northern coast of Eurasia navigable for considerably
longer periods during the year and is listing it as part
of its national boundaries in the Kremlin’s new Arctic strategy. Passage through these shorter routes will
significantly cut the time and costs of shipping. (See
Map 1-1.) In recent years, Russia has been particularly
active in the Arctic, aggressively advancing its interests and claims by using international law and also
establishing a comprehensive presence in the Arctic,
including the projection of military might into the region.
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Source: Jeannette J. Lee, “New Seafloor Maps May Bolster
U.S. Arctic Claims,” National Geographic News, February 12, 2008,
available from news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/02/080212AP-arctic-grab.html.

Map 1-1. U.S. and Russian Interests in the Arctic.
Despite the Arctic’s strategic location and vast resources, the United States has largely ignored this vital region. In the 11th hour of the Bush administration,
however, the White House issued a new Arctic policy,
but follow-through was left to the Obama administration, which has been slow to move on the issue. The
United States needs to implement a comprehensive
policy for the Arctic, including diplomatic, naval, mil2

itary, and economic policy components. The United
States needs to swiftly map U.S. territorial claims to
determine their extent and to defend against claims by
other countries. Thus exploiting the rich hydrocarbon
resources in the Arctic will continue to remain relevant
as China and India continue on courses of growth and
global economies rebound. These resources have the
potential to significantly enhance the economy and
the energy security of North America and the world,
and reduce U.S. dependence on Middle Eastern oil.
THE ARCTIC’S VAST UNTAPPED RESOURCES
The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic might hold as much as 90 billion barrels of oil—13
percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves—and
47.3 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of natural gas—30 percent of the world's undiscovered natural gas. At current consumption rates, assuming a 50 percent utilization rate of reserves, this is enough oil to meet global
demand for 1.4 years and U.S. demand for 6 years.
Arctic natural gas reserves may equal Russia’s proven
reserves, the world’s largest.1 (See Table 1-1.)
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Source: U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Energy Information
Agency, Government of the Northwest Territories of Canada and
the Russian Federation.

Table 1-1. Estimated and Proven Oil and Natural
Gas Reserves in the Arctic and Russia.
The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources estimates that the underwater Arctic region claimed
by Russia could hold as much as 586 billion barrels
of oil reserves.2 The ministry estimates that proven
oil deposits “in the Russian area of water proper” in
the Barents, Pechora, Kara, East Siberian, Chukchi,
and Laptev Seas could reach 418 million tons (3 billion barrels), and proven gas reserves could reach 7.7
tcm. Unexplored reserves could total 9.24 billion tons
(67.7 billion barrels) of oil and 88.3 tcm of natural gas.3
Overall, Russia estimates that these areas have up to
10 trillion tons of hydrocarbon deposits, the equivalent of 73 trillion barrels of oil.4
In addition to oil and gas, the Arctic seabed may
contain significant deposits of valuable metals and
precious stones, such as gold, silver, copper, iron,
lead, manganese, nickel, platinum, tin, zinc, and diamonds. The rise of China, India, and other developing
countries has increased global demand for these commodities.5
4

Alaska’s North Slope.
Alaska’s North Slope contributes significantly to
U.S. oil production and could supply more. The North
Slope is the region of Alaska extending from the Canadian border on the east to the Chukchi Sea Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) on the west. It includes the
Chukchi Sea OCS, the Beaufort Sea OCS, the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), the Central Arctic
(the region found between the Colville and Canning
Rivers), and the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska.6
(See Map 1-2.)

Source: Jeannette J. Lee, “New Seafloor Maps May Bolster
U.S. Arctic Claims,” National Geographic News, February 12, 2008,
available from news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/02/080212AP-arctic-grab.html.

Map 1-2. Alaska’s North Slope.
5

Between 1977 and 2004, the Prudhoe Bay oil field
on the North Slope produced more than 15 billion barrels of oil. By 1988, Prudhoe Bay accounted for more
than 25 percent of U.S. crude oil production. However, the Prudhoe Bay oil field is currently in steep
decline.7 A U.S. Department of Energy report found
that the Alaska North Slope has potentially 36 billion
barrels of oil and 3.8 tcm of natural gas, close to Nigeria’s proven reserves. The report also estimates that
the Chukchi Sea OCS and the Beaufort Sea OCS hold
combined energy reserves of 14 billion barrels of oil
and about 2 tcm of natural gas.8 Furthermore, these
reserves are especially attractive because their development is less limited by federal, state, and local legislation, as is the case with the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge (ANWR), and are thus more accessible to drilling.
To enhance U.S. energy security, America should
undertake a broad range of energy saving and diversification maneuvers, including expanding domestic oil
production. America remains one of the largest producers, but it is the only oil-producing nation on earth
that has placed a significant amount of its reserves out
of reach. Until recently, potentially large U.S. natural
gas deposits have been off limits. For instance, ANWR
holds potential reserves of about 10 billion barrels of
petroleum. Such reserves could lead to an additional 1
million barrels per day in domestic production. These
could be transported south through the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline, which has a spare capacity of 1 million barrels per day. An additional 1 million barrels per day
would save the United States $123 billion in petroleum
imports, create $7.7 billion in new economic activity,
and generate 128,000 new jobs.9
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Methane Hydrates.
Large methane hydrate deposits are located on the
deep seabed of the Arctic Ocean.10 Methane hydrates
are a solid form of natural gas with 3,000 times the
concentration of methane found in the atmosphere.11
While no technology currently exists to mine methane clusters, the capability appears to be just over the
horizon. The United States and Japan have agreed to
cooperate in researching and developing commercial
methane hydrate processing, with the goal of selling gas from methane hydrates by 2018.12 The South
Korean Ministry of Energy has also announced that
it will work with the United States in exploring and
developing methane hydrates deposits to develop a
commercially viable energy source. Seoul, South Korea, is also hoping to participate in the U.S.-sponsored
Alaska North Slope project in 2009 to test the viability
of using methane hydrates as an energy source.13
Growing Importance of Arctic Energy.
Arctic oil and gas resources have become increasingly important, given the tight energy market. Escalating demand for energy in 2001-08, stagnating
supply, political instability, growing resource nationalism, terrorism, and ethnic conflict combined to create a perfect storm in July 2008, with oil prices at $147
per barrel.14 While oil prices later retreated to around
$70-80 a barrel due to the financial crisis, global energy markets are expected to remain tight over the long
term as the fundamentals remain largely the same,
namely, rising demand from emerging markets outside U.S. control, and flattening supply. At the present
writing, crude oil prices are reaching alarming heights
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once again, with prices around $114 a barrel. While
these trends bode ill for security of energy supply, the
resources in the Arctic offer a glimmer of hope.
U.S. Energy Supplies. Developing oil deposits in the
Arctic is strategically important because the region is
not beset by religious, ethnic, or social strife and resource nationalism that plague oil-producing countries in the Middle East, West Africa, and Latin America. One way to reduce U.S. dependency on foreign oil
is to develop the Arctic oil fields. Such development
would lower prices in the international oil market,
even after accounting for high production costs and
the time lag for bringing new oil fields online. Moreover, the rich oil and gas deposits in Alaska’s North
Slope and in the U.S. offshore Arctic territories could
further increase U.S. energy supply by guaranteeing
availability of additional domestic energy supplies in
the time of a national emergency.15
Liquefied Natural Gas. U.S. demand for natural gas
was growing up until the global financial crisis but has
recently fallen. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) estimates that U.S. demand for natural gas
fell by 1.5 percent in 2009 and will remain relatively
unchanged during 2010.16 Consumption is projected
to rise slightly in 2011. Before the financial crisis, demand for natural gas was growing because U.S. energy demand has been growing; the current regulatory
environment favors gas over coal and nuclear, creating numerous barriers to entry for building coal and
nuclear plants. In addition, the relative importance
of gas should grow in coming years if stricter climate
regulations are enacted.
In 2004, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan
Greenspan saw increased imports of liquefied natural
gas (LNG) as a “price-pressure safety valve” for re-
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ducing prices and filling the gap from the diminishing North American gas supply.17 However, demand
for LNG has been uneven in recent years and has also
fallen due to the general drop in demand for gas and
increased shale production.
However, natural gas demand will continue to
grow in the years ahead, and increased imports of
LNG would augment domestic production and increase competition. In 2008, Royal Dutch Shell’s executive director of gas and power, Linda Cook, suggested that U.S. domestic production of natural gas could
run 15–20 billion cubic feet per day below domestic
demand by 2025.18 This prediction was made before
the augmented LNG production from the Arctic could
help to meet future demand and to reduce gas prices
in the domestic market, which would benefit industry
and consumers.
Opening the Arctic Outer Continental Shelf.
Driven by escalating demand, the Mineral Management Service in the U.S. Department of Interior
started offering oil and gas lease sales for drilling
rights in the OCS in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas in
2008. The Chukchi Sea lease sale in February 2008 was
the first OCS lease sale in 17 years.19
International corporations began flocking to the
High North. British Petroleum (BP) is developing a
drilling project known as Liberty in the OCS. In February 2008, Royal Dutch Shell paid $2.1 billion for
275 lease blocks in the Chukchi Sea Lease Sale 193. At
the February 2008 lease sale, Norway’s StatoilHydro
and Italy’s ENI were the high bidders on a number of
blocks. In total, seven companies participated in the
Chukchi Sea lease sale, which spans an area covering
5,354 blocks.20
9

In October 2009, the Interior Department gave conditional approval to Royal Dutch Shell for exploration
under two leases in the Beaufort Sea in Camden Bay,
west of Kaktovik.21 This exploration is opposed by
environmental groups. In addition, Ken Salazar, Secretary of the Interior, conditionally approved Royal
Dutch Shell's plan to drill three “exploratory,” and
“information-gathering” oil wells in the Chukchi Sea
during the next open season, which will be from July
to October 2010. This could open the door for offshore
oil and gas production in a new region of the Arctic.
In a press release, Salazar stated that “a key component of reducing our country’s dependence on
foreign oil is the environmentally-responsible exploration and development of America’s renewable and
conventional resources.” He continued, “By approving this Exploration Plan, we are taking a cautious but
deliberate step toward developing additional information on the Chukchi Sea.”22
These recent conditional approvals prompted
Alaska Senator Lisa Murkowski, the ranking Republican on the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee, to say: “This is progress [representing] an
encouraging sign that Alaska’s oil and natural gas resources can continue to play a major role in America’s
energy security.”23
In the future, these and other projects on the Arctic
OCS could deliver gas to the lower 48 states via the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline and the Canadian Mackenzie
Valley Pipeline. These prospects began to look even
brighter after a Canadian joint review panel endorsed
the Mackenzie Valley pipeline.24 The review panel is a
government-appointed seven-member, independent
body. There are still numerous obstacles to its realization, however. For example, the pipeline must receive
support from indigenous people and other federal
10

agencies. In addition, the pipeline is estimated to cost
$16.2 billion, and with natural gas prices low, the project looks less favorable.
U.S. CLAIMS IN THE ARCTIC
The United States announced its new Arctic Region Policy on January 9, 2009, the 11th hour of the
Bush Administration. The document is meant to serve
as a strategic roadmap for more specific action plans.
The policy states that the U.S. national and homeland
security interests in the Arctic are missile defense and
early warning; deployment of the sea and air systems
for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime
presence, and maritime security operations; ensuring
freedom of navigation and airlift; and preventing terrorist attacks.25 The document also delineates the U.S.
position on international governance, boundary and
transportation, economic issues and environment protection, and scientific cooperation.
The policy statement urges the U.S. Senate to approve the U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty (UNCLOS) promptly.
The United States currently is not a party to the UNCLOS and therefore is not bound by any procedures
and determinations concluded through UNCLOS instruments. Instead, the United States is pursuing its
claims “as an independent, sovereign nation,” relying
in part on Harry S. Truman’s Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, which declares that any hydrocarbon
or other resources discovered beneath the U.S. conti
nental shelf are the property of the United States.26 The
United States can defend its rights and claims through
bilateral negotiations and in multilateral venues such
as the Arctic Ocean Conference in May 2008, which
met in Ilulissat, Greenland.
11

Despite the new U.S. Arctic strategy, some have argued that the United States will not have leverage or a
“seat at the table” to pursue or defend its Arctic claims
if the United States is not a party to UNCLOS. However, U.S. attendance at the conference in Ilulissat as well
U.S. participation in the Arctic Council27 significantly
weakened this argument. Even though the United
States is not a party to UNCLOS, other Arctic nations
“are unable to assert credible claims on U.S. territory
in the Arctic or anywhere else in the world” because
President Truman already underlined U.S. rights to
Arctic resources with his proclamation.28
Yet to protect its rights, the United States needs to
know how far its claims stretch into the Arctic Ocean.
The new U.S. strategy urges the United States to take
“all the actions necessary to establish the outer limit
of the continental shelf appertaining to the United
States.”29 The United States requires a modern flotilla
of icebreakers to conduct mapping and to establish
U.S. claims. Yet, a prominent Arctic expert argued before the U.S. Congress that the new policy does not
outline funding allocations for acquisition of the new
icebreakers.30 The U.S. Coast Guard currently has only
three icebreakers, of which only the Healy (commissioned in 2000) is relatively new. The other two icebreakers, while heavier than the Healy and thus capable of breaking through thicker ice, are at the end
of their design service life after operating for about
30 years. Yet even if the United States begins allocating funds now, it will be 8 to 10 years before a new
icebreaker can enter service. Moreover, no money has
been allocated to build a new-generation heavy icebreaker.31
A 2008 mapping expedition undertaken by the icebreaker Healy in the Chukchi Sea focused on surveying an area 400 to 600 miles north of Alaska cost about
12

$1.2 million—a pittance compared to the billions of
dollars of Arctic natural resources at stake. The survey indicated that the foot, or lowest part of the Alaskan continental shelf, stretches more than 100 miles
beyond what was previously thought, thus expanding
the U.S. claim.32
The United States has been mapping the bottom of
the Arctic Ocean and the OCS since 2003.33 Mapping
is essential to determining the extent of the U.S. OCS
and discovering whether the United States has any
legitimate claims to territory beyond its 200-nauticalmile exclusive economic zone. According to the U.S.
Department of State, the United States had made five
Arctic cruises since 2003, and the Obama administration is continuing the multiyear effort to map the Arctic seabed.34
The United States and Canada have joined efforts
in mapping missions to determine the boundary of
each country’s Arctic continental shelves.35 The activities are part of the multiyear, multiagency effort undertaken by the U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Project, led by the Department of State, with vice co-chairs
from the Department of the Interior and the National
Oceanic Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The
joint 2009 continental Shelf Survey mission, which
lasted from August 7 to September 16, 2009, marks
the second year of such cooperative endeavors.36 More
such activities are planned for 2010.37
Mapping is important for resolving any conflicting claims by other Arctic nations. For example, the
United States and Canada have likely claimed some of
the same parts of the continental shelf.38 Canada and
Russia occupy 75 percent of the Arctic Ocean’s coastline. They each claim that the channels between their
Arctic islands and coasts are their “internal waters,”
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and that if a foreign vessel needs to pass, it requires
authorization. The position of the United States is that
the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage are
“international straits.”39 Mapping data will help to determine whether Russian claims conflict with U.S. and
Canadian claims.
The presidential memorandum signed in January
2009 tasks the Department of Defense to “project a
sovereign maritime presence” in the Arctic. In October 2009, the U.S. Navy released a Roadmap for Future Arctic Operations.40 The objective of the roadmap
is to ensure naval readiness and capability, and promote maritime security in the Arctic region. Essential
elements of the plan include increasing operational
experience, promoting cooperative partnerships, and
improving environmental understanding.41
More recently, Senator Murkowski introduced Bill
S.2849 to validate the U.S. interest in the Arctic. The bill
requires a study and report on the feasibility of establishing a deep water sea port in the Arctic “to protect
and advance strategic United States interests within
the evolving and ever more important region.”42 The
bill was referred to the Senate Armed Services Committee.43
RUSSIAN CLAIMS
After its invasion of Georgia, Russia has clearly
hardened its international posture and is increasingly
relying on power, not international law, to settle its
claims. Moscow has also stepped up its anti-American
policies and rhetoric and is likely to challenge U.S. interests whenever and wherever it can, including in the
High North.
For over 2 centuries, Russia has taken its role as
an Arctic power seriously. In 2001, Russia submitted
14

to UNCLOS a formal claim for an area of 1.2 million
square kilometers (460,000 square miles) that runs
from the undersea Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev
Ridge to the North Pole. This is roughly the combined area of Germany, France, and Italy.44 The UN
Commission refused to accept the claim, instead requesting “additional data and information.”45 Russia
responded by sending a scientific mission including
a nuclear-powered icebreaker and two mini-submarines to the area. During this meticulously organized
media event, the mission planted the Russian flag on
the ocean’s floor at the Lomonosov Ridge after collecting soil samples that supposedly prove the ridge
is part of the Eurasian landmass. During the mission,
Deputy Chairman of the Russian Duma, Artur Chilingarov, the veteran Soviet explorer heading the scientific expedition, declared, “The Arctic is ours, and we
should demonstrate our presence.”46 Such statements
run counter to the spirit of international cooperation,
striking as inappropriate for a scientific mission.
The United States has objected to these claims, stating that they have “major flaws.” Professor Timo Koivurova of the University of Lapland in Finland stated
that “oceanic ridges cannot be claimed as part of the
state’s continental shelf.”47 Russia planned to resubmit
its claim in 2009, but missed the deadline. However,
this does not mean that Moscow has been idle in its
Nordic push. On the contrary, Russia has been moving
rapidly to establish a comprehensive sea, ground, and
air presence in the Arctic. Moscow has also released
a new Arctic policy and has referenced the Arctic in
several other important official publications. Despite
missing the deadline, Russia is still pursuing its claims
through UNCLOS. To advance these claims, Russia is
currently undertaking a 3-year-long mapping mis-
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sion of the Arctic.48 This mission also has a peculiar
military escort. Despite pursuing its claims through
UNCLOS, Russia appears to be seeking to establish a
comprehensive presence in the Arctic that will allow
the Kremlin to take de facto possession of the underwater territories currently in dispute.
RUSSIA’S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
TOWARD THE ARCTIC
In October 2009, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and, by extension, the Russian Federation,
became head of the trustees of one of Russia’s oldest institutions, the Russian Geographical Society.49
Founded by Tsar Nicholas I in 1845 with headquarters
in St. Petersburg, this prestigious society was started
as part of the imperial drive for geographic expansion
and exploration of the country’s resources.50 During
his address to the society’s congress, Putin praised
the society’s past contributions to Russia’s geographic
expansion and spoke about work ahead, including in
the Arctic:
When we say great, a great country, a great state—
certainly, size matters. . . . When there is no size, there
is no influence, no meaning. . . . The society can offer practical support to our plans to develop Eastern Siberia and the Far East, Yamal and the north of
Krasnoyarsk region, to participate actively in further
research projects in the Arctic and Antarctica, as well
as environmental support of the Olympic Games in
Sochi.51

While the society was funded by the state during
Soviet times, it was left to fend for itself during the
1990s. But during his speech, Putin pledged funding
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for grants and promised to “do everything to help your
work.”52 According to Vyacheslav Isayev, a member
of the society’s Sochi branch, the new president, the
charter, and the creation of the board of trustees were
all introduced in October 2009.53
Also during this time, Russian President Dmitry
Medvedev signed a decree on October 21, 2009, creating a new Arctic university. The decree states that the
State Technical University in Arkhangelsk will transform into the Northern (Arctic) Federal University.54
As Arctic watcher Mia Bennett points out, it is likely
that this institution will work to produce research
supporting Russia’s territorial claims, as well on oil
and gas exploration prospects.55
Arctic Policy.
The two initiatives discussed above conform to
policy objectives and directives dating back to July
2008. At that time, President Dmitry Medvedev published The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation.56 This document established the importance of
the Arctic in Russian national security policy: “In accordance with the international law, Russia intends to
establish the boundaries of its continental shelf, thus
expanding opportunities for exploration and exploitation of its mineral resources.”57
Then, in September 2008, the Russian Federation
approved its official Arctic strategy and published it in
March 2009 under the subheading: “The fundamentals
of state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic
in the period up to 2020 and beyond.”58 The document
clearly emphasizes the importance of the Arctic to
Russia’s economic and social development. In particular, the Arctic is seen as a key zone for expanding Rus-
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sia’s hydrocarbon reserves. According to a translation
by the American Foreign Policy Council, the Russian
Federation sees its “Arctic zone as a national strategic
resource base capable of fulfilling the socio-economic
tasks associated with national growth.”59
Accordingly, one of the main goals of the Russian Federation’s official state policy is to “expand
the resource base of the Arctic zone of the Russian
Federation, which is capable in large part of fulfilling
Russia’s needs for hydrocarbon resources, aqueous
biological resources, and other forms of strategic raw
material.”60 The main goal of the policy is to transform
the Arctic into Russia’s strategic resource base and
make Russia a leading Arctic power by 2020. This is to
be accomplished in stages. Cartographic, geologicalgeophysical, and hydrographic work must be carried
out by 2010 to substantiate the outer boundary of Russia’s Arctic zone. This data will support Russia’s international claims. These claims and the codification of
Russia’s Arctic zone under international law, and the
means for Russia’s transportation of energy resources,
must be realized before 2015. By 2020, the Arctic zone
should be the leading strategic resource base of the
country.
In order to realize these goals, the Russian Federation must provide for security. The main objectives of
the Russian Federation’s official state policy in the
Arctic will be achieved by performing the following
basic tasks:
in the sphere of national security, the protection of the
national border of the Russian Federation . . . it is necessary: to create general purpose military formations
drawn from the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, [as well as] other troops and military formations
(most importantly, border units) in the Arctic zone of
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the Russian Federation, capable of ensuring security
under various military and political circumstances.61

The creation of this Arctic military group will be
drawn from the armed forces of the Russian Federation as well as the power ministries (e.g., Federal Security Service [FSB] troops, border troops, and internal troops ). Above all, the document calls for a coast
guard that will patrol Russia’s Arctic waters and estuaries.
Russian National Security Strategy.
On May 12, 2009, President Medvedev approved
the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation
until 2020 (NSS).62 This doctrine replaced the national
security concepts of 1997 and 2000. The document
posited that Russia’s ability to defend its national security depended overall on the country’s economic
potential. Russia’s natural resources are viewed as a
base for this economic development and determine its
geopolitical influence. On February 4, 2009, Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was quoted as saying: “Russia enjoys vast energy and mineral resources
which serve as a base to develop its economy; as an
instrument to implement domestic and foreign policy.
The role of the country in international energy markets determines, in many ways, its geopolitical influence.”63
As the late Roman Kupchinksy pointed out, the
view that energy is a useful geopolitical tool would
find its way into the new strategy. Paragraph 9 of the
doctrine states: “The change from bloc confrontation
to the principles of multi-vector diplomacy and the
[natural] resources potential of Russia, along with the
pragmatic policies of using them, has expanded the
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possibilities of the Russian Federation to strengthen
its influence on the world arena.”64
Perhaps more telling is paragraph 11, which lays
out the future battlegrounds where conflicts over energy will occur: “The attention of international politics
in the long term will be concentrated on controlling
the sources of energy resources in the Middle East, on
the shelf of the Barents Sea and other parts of the Arctic, in the Caspian Basin and in Central Asia.” Ominously, the document posits that future competition
for energy near Russian borders or its allies may be
resolved with military force: “In case of a competitive
struggle for resources it is not impossible to discount
that it might be resolved by a decision to use military
might. The existing balance of forces on the borders of
the Russian Federation and its allies can be changed.”65
This inclusion of armed conflict in the strategy
document certainly got the attention of the Canadians.
Rob Huebert, a political scientist of the University of
Calgary’s Center for Military and Strategic Studies,
stated that the Russian outlook appears to be a “realistic” review of possible conflicts. He stated that the
Russians have been talking very cooperatively, but
they have been backing it up with an increasingly
strong military set of options. This doctrine and Russia’s aggressive behavior should spur Canada’s efforts
to beef up Arctic defenses, all the while continuing to
look for areas of cooperation.66
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
has also noticed the potential for conflict with Russia
in the High North. Admiral James Stavridis, Supreme
Allied Commander for Europe, speaking at the Royal
United Services Institute in London on NATO’s future
direction, mentioned NATO-Russia relations in the
context of territorial disputes and overlapping claims.
He said:
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This is something we are starting to spend more time
looking at. I look at the High North and I think it could
either be a zone of conflict, I hope not, a zone of competition, probably. It could also be cooperative . . . and
as an alliance we should make this as cooperative as
we possibly can.67

RUSSIA’S MILITARIZATION OF THE ARCTIC
As part of its effort to create a comprehensive presence in the Arctic, Russia has been steadily expanding its military component there since 2007. In August
2007, shortly after sending the scientific expedition to
the Arctic ridge, then Russian President Putin ordered
the resumption of regular air patrols over the Arctic
Ocean. Strategic bombers, including the turboprop
Tupolev Tu-95, supersonic bombers Tu-160 (Blackjack/
White Swan) and Tu-22M3 (Backfire), and the longrange anti-submarine warfare patrol aircraft Tu-142
have flown patrols since then.68 According to the Russian Air Force, the Tu-95 bombers refueled in flight
to extend their operational patrol area.69 During 2007
alone, Russian bombers penetrated the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 12-mile
air defense identification zone surrounding Alaska 18
times.70 Since August 2007, the Russian Air Force has
flown more than 90 missions over the Arctic, Atlantic,
and Pacific Oceans.71
On the strategic level, the Russian Navy is expanding its presence in the Arctic for the first time since
the end of the Cold War.72 Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, head of the Defense Ministry’s combat
training department, said that the Russian Navy is increasing the operational radius of the Northern Fleet’s
submarines and that Russia’s military strategy might
be reoriented to meet threats to the country’s interests
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in the Arctic, particularly with regard to its continental shelf. Shamanov said that “we have a number of
highly professional military units in the Leningrad,
Siberian and Far Eastern military districts, which are
specifically trained for combat in Arctic regions.”73
On July 14, 2008, the Russian Navy announced
that its fleet had “resumed a warship presence in the
Arctic.” These Arctic naval patrols include the area of
the Spitsbergen archipelago that belongs to Norway, a
NATO member. Russia refuses to recognize Norway’s
right to a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone
around Spitsbergen. Russia deployed an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) destroyer followed by a guidedmissile cruiser armed with 16 long-range anti-ship
cruise missiles designed to destroy aircraft carriers.74
The resumption of Cold War–style patrols and increased naval presence in the Arctic is in keeping with
Moscow’s more forward posture and is intended to
increase its leverage vis-à-vis territorial claims. Moscow is taking the dual approach of projecting military
power while invoking international law. Regarding
the naval deployments near Spitsbergen, the Russian
Navy stated: “Sorties of warships of the Northern
Fleet will be made periodically with a necessary regularity. All actions of the Russian warships are fulfilled
strictly in accordance with the international maritime
law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea.”75
At a meeting of the Russian government’s Maritime Board in April 2008, Russian Foreign Minister
Sergei Lavrov backed a policy of settling territorial
disputes in the region with the countries bordering
the Arctic through cooperation. Then-First Deputy
Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov stressed in his remarks
that Russia observes international law on the matter
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through adherence to two international conventions:
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, signed
by Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United
States; and the 1982 UNCLOS.76
While paying lip service to international law, Russian’s ambitious actions hearken back to 19th century
statecraft rather than the 21st century law-based policy.
They appear to indicate that the Kremlin believes that
credible displays of power will settle the conflicting
territorial claims. By comparison, the West’s posture
toward the Arctic has been irresolute and inadequate.
During 2008 and 2009, Russian icebreakers were
constantly patrolling in the Arctic. Russia has the largest such flotilla in the world: 18 operational icebreakers.77 Seven of these are nuclear, including the 50 Years
of Victory, the largest icebreaker in the world.78 Russia
is modernizing its Northern Fleet and hopes to expand
funding for more nuclear icebreakers.
Indeed, Russia plans to build new nuclear-powered icebreakers starting in 2015. In April 2009, Segey
Kirienko, director of Rosatom State Corporation, announced that government funding for new nuclear
icebreakers in the federal budget would total U.S. $57
million; and another U.S. $150 million for 2010-11. Experts estimate that Russia will need to build six to 10
nuclear icebreakers over the next 20 years to maintain
and expand its current level of operations.79
RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
Shortly after the release of the Arctic strategy in
August 2008, President Medvedev signed into force a
law that allows “the government to allocate strategic
oil and gas deposits on the continental shelf without
auctions.” The law restricts participation to companies
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with 5 years’ experience in a region’s continental shelf
and in which the government controls no less than a
50 percent stake, thus effectively allowing only statecontrolled Gazprom and Rosneft to participate.80
After the global financial crisis ensued and Russia
entered a deep recession in 2008, the Kremlin backtracked on this policy and began seeking foreign investors for Arctic gas development. In September 2009,
Prime Minister Putin hosted numerous oil and gas executives from around the world in Salekhard, Siberia,
to discuss the development of liquefied natural gas
on the Yamal peninsula in the Arctic.81 Russia badly
needs the foreign investment, as well as the technical
expertise which the international oil companies have.
In addition to icebreakers, Russia is constructing
an Arctic oil rig in the northern shipbuilding center of
Severodvinsk, scheduled for completion by the summer of 2010 and to be handed over to Gazprom.82 The
rig is to be the first of its kind, capable of operating in
temperatures as low as minus 50 degrees Celsius (minus 58 degrees Fahrenheit) and withstanding the impact of ice packs. The new rig was commissioned by
the state-owned Gazprom, demonstrating that Russia
is serious about oil exploration in the Arctic.83
Russia announced plans in May 2008 for a fleet of
floating and submersible nuclear power stations for
use in exploiting Arctic oil and gas. Construction of
the prototype station, Akademik Lomonosov, was
scheduled to be completed at Baltiysky Zavod in St.
Petersburg84 by the end of 2010.85 It will be deployed at
Vilyuchinsk, in the Kamchatka region in Russia’s Far
East by the end of 2012.86 A floating power plant has
a higher risk of accident with potential disastrous impact on the environment.87 Rosatom plans to construct
seven more floating nuclear power plants to be used
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on the Kola, Yamal, and Chukotka peninsulas and the
Kamchatka region. Further sites for floating nuclear
plants include Yakutia and Taimyr.88
ARCTIC SEA LANES
The Arctic Ocean has two main sea routes that are
open to shipping for about 5 months per year with
the help of icebreakers: the Northern Sea Route and
the Northwest Passage. (See Map 1.) The Northern
Sea Route links the Barents Sea in the west with the
Chukchi Sea to the east and services isolated settlements along Russia’s long Arctic coastline. If the Arctic ice cap continues to shrink, the northern route will
become a major conduit for international shipping.89
If the Northern Sea Route is navigable for a longer
period of time, it would make the transportation of
commodities to international markets easier and may
significantly reduce transportation costs between the
Pacific Rim and Northern Europe and Eurasia.
A Russian Information Agency Novosti political
commentator argued:
The country that dominates this sea lane will dictate
its terms to the developers of the shelf deposits and
will see the biggest gains from the transportation of
raw materials to the Pacific and the Atlantic. These include billions of tons of oil and trillions of cubic meters
of gas, not to mention other minerals in which the local lands abound.90

Another Russian expert similarly warned, “If we
do not start immediately reviving the Arctic transportation system, voyages on the Northern Sea Route will
be led by the Japanese or the Americans.”91
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To protect critical lines of transportation such as
the Northern Sea Route, and to secure Russian Federation national borders, Russia is planning to conduct
a military buildup in the Arctic. According to Marcel
de Haas, Senior Research Fellow at the Netherlands
Institute of International Relations Clingendael, General Nikolay Patrushev in 2004, at the time head of the
FSB (successor to the domestic wing of the KGB), a
Putin confidant, and today Secretary of the Russian
National Security Council, created a special Arctic Directorate at the FSB.92
Russia’s new Arctic policy, according to de Haas,
emphasizes FSB elements more than Ministry of Defense units, stating that the FSB will provide a system
of coastal defense.93 This system will augment the
FSB-controlled border troops and will patrol Russia’s
Arctic borders.94 This will ultimately require the creation of more border infrastructure and equipping of
the coast guard force with the necessary equipment to
enable it to control and monitor Russia’s Arctic zone.
According to Roger McDermott, while the FSB will
take the lead on the coastal defense, a military assault
force could be airlifted into the area.95
The Russian Federation Arctic policy proclaims
that “the use of the Northern Sea Route as a national
unified transportation link of the Russian Federation
in the Arctic”96 to be a national interest of Russia.97 In
November 2009, Russia announced that it will charge
ships a “fair” price to take the Northern Sea Route
between the Atlantic to the Pacific. This route, which
is already used by Rosneft, is three times faster than
its alternative through the Suez canal. Alexasandr
Davydenko, head of the Federal Sea and River Transport Agency, said in an interview for Russia Today that
he hopes the ice will melt soon.98 But the capabilities of
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Russian ports are not adequate to receive more ships.
The port of Murmansk already tenders the construction of new terminals to foreign bidders.99
The United States, on the other hand, stated in its
Arctic Strategy that:
Freedom of the seas is a top national priority. Northern Sea Route includes straits used for international
navigation; the regime of transit passage applies to
passage through those straits. Preserving the rights
and duties relating to navigation and overflight in the
Arctic region supports our ability to exercise these
rights throughout the world, including through strategic straits.100

The Northwest Passage.
The Northwest Passage runs through Canada’s
Arctic archipelago. If the polar ice cap continues to
recede, the Northwest Passage will become a major
shipping lane for international trade between Europe
and Asia, cutting transit times substantially. Currently, navigation is possible along the Northwest Passage
during a 7-week period with the use of icebreakers.101
According to a report by the U.S. Office of Naval
Research, by 2050 “[t]he Northwest Passage through
the Canadian Archipelago and along the coast of Alaska will be ice-free and navigable every summer by
non-icebreaking ships.”102 Use of the Northwest Passage is a contentious issue between the United States
and Canada. The United States argues that “it is a strait
for international navigation,” regarding the Northwest Passage as international waters. Canada, on the
other hand, claims that the straits of the sea route are
“inland seas” falling under Canadian sovereignty.103
After a 1985 incident in which a U.S. Coast Guard
icebreaker passed through the waters without asking
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for Canadian permission, Canada declared the Northwest Passage to be “internal waters.” On December
3, 2009, the Canadian House of Commons renamed
the Northwest Passage the “Canadian Northwest Passage.”104 Resolving this dispute amicably is essential so
that both countries can benefit from further economic
and security cooperation.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The United States has a strong interest in cooperating with its Arctic neighbors, especially Canada, in
developing offshore oil and gas fields and policing the
region. Canada is a close NATO ally and a reliable oil
and natural gas supplier to the United States. Canada
also maintains a very friendly investment climate
compared to other energy-producing nations.
At a recent conference, Robert McLeod, former
minister of energy of Canada’s Northwest Territories,
said that exploitation of the oil and gas resources in
the Arctic would improve North American energy security and that “the combined northern gas reserves
in Canada and the United States could supply southern markets in Canada and the United States with 8
billion cubic feet per day.”105
Opportunities also exist for cooperation in defense
and national security. As during the Cold War, the
United States could work with its NATO partners
in the Arctic region. This is already taking place at
the U.S. Air Force base in Thule, Greenland, under
bilateral agreements between the United States and
Denmark that facilitate this cooperation. The United
States and Canadian Coast Guards resupply Thule Air
Base.106 The most important example of U.S.–Canadian
defense cooperation is North American Aerospace

28

Defense Command (NORAD). The Alaskan NORAD
Region is regaining its former relevance as the Russian bombers resumed their incursions.107
Warmer ocean temperatures and a smaller ice cap
would provide increased opportunities for U.S.–Canadian maritime cooperation in combating potential
terrorist operations and unlawful navigation. Moreover, warming of the northern portion of the Bering
Sea may induce the migration of fish to the Arctic
Ocean, creating the necessity for joint fishing regulation.108 With the North Pacific already suffering from
massive poaching, unlawful fishing could become a
problem. Joint law enforcement coordination for commercial fishing will be increasingly important.
REESTABLISHING THE U.S. ARCTIC PRESENCE
The United States needs to revitalize its Arctic policy, beginning by elevating U.S. Arctic policy from its
third-tier status to a national priority. Specifically, the
United States should:
•	Create an interagency task force on the Arctic
at the NSC level, bringing together the Departments of Defense, State, Interior, and Energy to
develop the overall U.S. policy toward the region. The United States should use diplomatic,
military, and economic means to maintain its
sovereign rights in the Arctic. The United States
should also establish a Joint Task Force–Arctic
Region Command, headed by a Coast Guard
flag officer. This joint task force would maintain
U.S. sovereign rights and have an interagency
staff with representatives from relevant U.S.
agencies and departments. The United States
should also establish an Arctic Coast Guard Fo-
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rum modeled after the highly successful Northern Pacific Coast Guard Forum.
•	Accelerate the acquisition of icebreakers to
support the timely mapping of the Arctic OCS
and the Arctic in general to advance U.S. national interests. The United States needs to
swiftly map U.S. claims on the OCS and areas
adjacent to Alaska to preserve its sovereign
territorial rights. Timely mapping will be important as the other Arctic nations submit their
claims within the 10-year window. The United
States should not rely on mapping from other
countries to advance its claims or to defend
against the claims of other countries.
•	Provide the U.S. Coast Guard with a sufficient
operations and maintenance budget to support an increased, regular, and influential presence in the Arctic.
•	Reach out to Canada, Norway, Denmark, and,
wherever possible, Russia. Coordination, cooperation, and diplomacy with Canada and European allies with interests in the region will be
required to prevent conflict with Russia and to
maintain the special relationship with Canada.
The United States needs to work with Canada
to develop a mutually beneficial framework for
settling outstanding legal issues and the commercial exploitation of Arctic hydrocarbons.
•	Create a public–private Arctic task force to
provide a formal avenue for the private sector to advise the U.S. Government on Arctic
economic development. This task force should
include representatives from energy, natural
resources, and shipping sectors among others.
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•	Authorize oil exploration and production in
ANWR and other promising Arctic areas in
order to expand domestic energy supply. Con
gress should also streamline regulations for
areas that it has already opened but heavily
regulated.
CONCLUSION
As an Arctic nation, the United States has significant geopolitical and geo-economic interests in the
High North. The United States should not just have
a place at the table, but also seek to lead in navigating the nascent challenges and opportunities, such as
disputes over the Outer Continental Shelf, the navigation of Arctic sea-lanes, and commercial development
of natural resources and fisheries. The United States
needs to revitalize its Arctic policy and commit the
necessary resources to sustain America’s leadership
role in the High North.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ARCTIC:
A CLASH OF INTERESTS OR CLASH
OF AMBITIONS
Alexandr’ Golts
Any observer who followed the statements of politicians as well as press coverage during the last 2 or 3
years must come to a definite conclusion: confrontation is growing in the Arctic region. Russia, which is
planning to lodge a bid for the area, measuring 1.2 million square kilometers (km) with the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, is ready to play a
key role in the confrontation. Moscow has made several symbolically provocative gestures. In 2007, Artur
Chilingarov, a famous Polar explorer and vice-speaker
of the State Duma, led two Russian mini-submarines
on a mission to stake Russia’s claim to the region. The
two submarines descended 2.5 miles (4 km) to the Arctic seabed, where they collected geological and water
samples and dropped a titanium canister containing
the Russian flag to bolster Russia’s argument that the
Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of its territory.
General Vladimir Shamanov, at that time Chief of
Ministry of Defense (MOD) Main Directorate of Combat Training, stated in 2008 that “after the reaction of
a certain number of heads of state to Russia’s territorial claims to the continental plateau of the Arctic, the
training division has immediately set out [training]
plans for troops that could be engaged in Arctic combat missions.” Shamanov mentioned that MOD made
corrections in training plans for Leningrad, Siberian,
and Far Eastern military districts so they would be
ready to conduct operations in the region.1
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A few months later, Shamanov, who in the meantime was appointed the Commander in chief of Russian Airborne Troops, announced that a team of
Russian paratroopers was preparing for a symbolic
landing at the Northern Pole to mark the 60th anniversary of a Cold War achievement by two Soviet
scientists, who had landed at the North Pole in 1949.
The proposed parachute drop was described by a top
Russian general as a mission symbolizing the protection of national interests in the northern direction.
Insisting that the operation would not stoke military
tensions in the Arctic, General Vladimir Shamanov is
quoted as saying: “We do not intend to engage in [saber-] rattling, we only intend to make a peaceful visit
to the North Pole.”2
In recent years, the Russian armed forces undertook several actions to demonstrate ambitions to control the Arctic region. In February 2009, Canadian
fighter jets scrambled to intercept an approaching
Russian bomber less than 24 hours before U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Ottawa, Canada. In August 2009, two Russian attack submarines of Project
971 Schuka-B were sent to patrol Arctic regions near
Canadian national borders. In the spring of 2009, Vice
Admiral Oleg Burtsev, deputy head of the Navy Staff,
said that Northern Fleet submarines will help in the
protection and study of the Arctic shelf adjacent to the
territory of Russia.3
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
spokesman James Appathurai’s statement that the
Arctic region is of high strategic importance to NATO
in terms of providing security for allies received a
tough reaction from the Russian side. “NATO lacked
the technical capability to enhance its military presence in the Arctic. Only our country has the unique
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technical equipment capable of solving the problems
of extreme Arctic conditions, and nothing can be compared with our fleet of icebreakers in terms of mobility
and effectiveness,” Artur Chilingarov said.4
“Plans for training the Navy of Russia will take
into account the presence of NATO ships in the Arctic,“ said a senior representative of the Main Staff of
the Navy of Russia to a RIA Novosti correspondent.
He noted that Russia’s military leadership will pay
special attention to protecting national interests in the
Arctic. “The main role here is assigned to nuclear submarines, which are the core of naval strategic nuclear
forces of the country,” said the source. He promised
that the Navy is and will be ready to control marine areas “throughout the length of the northern sea borders
of Russia.” Chief of General Staff General Nikolai Makarov said that Russia should adequately respond to
attempts to militarize the Arctic. “We watch what will
be the degree of militarization of the region. Depending on this we will undertake adequate measures.”5 On
April 18, 2008, at a meeting of the Maritime Collegium
of the Russian government, Navy Commander Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky said that now there is peace
and stability in the Arctic, but he did not exclude the
possibility of territorial redistribution with the help of
“armed intervention.”6
These symbolic acts and militant statements were
supported by doctrinal documents signed by Russian
president Dmitry Medvedev. The most sensational
part of the National Security Strategy adopted in May
2009 includes plans to create army units in Russia’s
Arctic region to “guarantee military security in different military-political situations.” The strategy, approved by President Medvedev, declares the Arctic
to be Russia’s most important arena for international
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and military security in its relations with other countries. A coast guard unit of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the KGB, is planned to advance Russia’s policy in the region. The strategy calls
for the creation of an intelligence network to provide
“effective control of economic, military, [and] ecological activity” in the Arctic.7
A few months earlier, in September 2008, the Security Council adopted “The fundamentals of Russian state policy in the Arctic up to 2020 and beyond,”
which outlines the country’s strategy in the region, including the deployment of military, border, and coastal guard units “to guarantee Russia’s military security
in diverse military and political circumstances.”8 According to some sources, the Arctic Group of Forces
will be part of the FSB, whose former chief and current
secretary of the Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev,
is a strong proponent of an aggressive state policy in
the Arctic.
A few days before the adoption of the document
on September 12, 2008, the Security Council of Russia
held a meeting on strategic planning for “the problems
of increasing the presence of Russia in the Arctic.” Under the leadership of then-director of the FSB Nikolai
Patrushev, the leading members of the Security Council (speakers of State Duma and Council Federation,
defense and interior ministers, the heads of the FSB
and SVR) went to Franz Josef Land where the outpost
of the FSB Border Guards Nagurskaya is stationed, to
discuss the buildup of a military presence. The meeting was presented as a symbolic act. “For the first time
in the history of Russia’s Security Council, the event
of such a high rank is held outside the Arctic Circle,”
according to the official press release.9
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All this creates the impression that Russia is seriously preparing to fight (including the use of military
force) for possession of a huge Arctic space. Moscow
filed a claim with the United Nations (UN) Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in
December 2001 with the hope of getting the rights to
areas lying beyond its 200-mile zone. The matter at
stake involves a territory exceeding 1.2 million square
kilometers (km) in the Barents Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk,
the Bering Strait, and the ice-free waters of the Arctic Ocean, which Russia views as its sovereign possessions. This claim rests on “Russian research of the
earth’s crust structure at the Mendeleyev Elevation in
the Arctic Ocean that has proven the continental nature of many sections of the oceanic floor, which were
previously attributed to the sub-oceanic type.”10
Formally, Russia’s claim does not contradict the
norms of international maritime law. The Convention on the Law of the Sea passed by the UN in 1982
does envision an opportunity for littoral countries to
expand their sovereign rights beyond the 200-mile
exclusive economic zone—not infinitely, though, but
only over those sections of the seabed of which the
continental origins have been proved conclusively.
Russia was the first country ever to lodge a claim with
the CLCS; there is no mechanism for passing decisions
of this kind. The UN regulations suggest that if a country lodging a claim agrees with the commission’s recommendations, the latter are made public, after which
the revised borders become final and mandatory.
The first attempt did not bring the desired result,
as the CLCS asked for more convincing geological and
geophysical evidence that the Mendeleyev and Lomonosov submerged ridges are extensions of Russia’s
continental shelf. Russia’s intensive Arctic research
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carried out in 2005-07 and the symbolic culmination
of this activity—the installation of the Russian tricolor
on the sea floor—were called upon to add more weight
to the official claim. The second claim will be filed not
earlier then 2013.11
If successful, this theoretically would provide
Moscow unbelievable wealth. It would have at its disposal the Northern Sea Route, which, together with
the Northwest Passage, would give Russia the opportunity to control the shortest route between North
America, Europe, and Asia. Moreover, if Moscow can
prove its right to own a significant part of the Arctic Ocean, it will be allowed to develop oil and gas
deposits. Experts estimate oil and gas deposits in the
Russian part of the Arctic at 25 percent of the world’s
hydrocarbon reserves (approximately 15.5 billion tons
of oil and 84.5 trillion cubic meters of gas). At present, Russia is already extracting up to 90 percent of
the nickel and cobalt in the Arctic, 60 percent of the
copper, 96 percent of platinoids, and 100 percent of
apatite concentrate.12
Setting that aside, one should answer first of all the
question of whether in the foreseeable future there is
any realistic opportunity to obtain the wealth of the
Arctic. All hopes are connected with the theory of
melting Arctic ice. But this is only theory, not a fait
accompli, as some authors insist.13 The basis for predictions is the fact that from 1980 to 2007 mankind
witnessed the melting of Arctic ice by 14 percent. At
the same time, representatives of different schools of
thought contend that the melting is no more than a
change in the cyclic fluctuations of climate over the
past 400 years, and an attempt to make predictions
based on data of the past 30 years is simply incorrect.14
Such skepticism is validated by the fact that during
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the last 2 years the process of melting ice stopped and
began to grow.
However, even those who believe in the prospects
for the release of the Arctic Ocean from ice, such as
the former Prime Minister of Norway, believe that it
would not occur until 2040. “The Arctic area would
be of interest in 50 or 100 years—not now,” said Lars
Kullerud, President of the University of the Arctic.15
Previous forecasts had predicted the Arctic would
be ice-free in summers towards the end of the 21st
century. The most rationally-minded representatives
of Russian official circles, for example, charge d’affaires
of Russia in Canada, Sergei Petrov, have expressed
their skepticism. He publically insisted that very few
people take into account how difficult it would be to
extract the resources buried beneath the ice and permafrost. He said that even the generation of his children probably will not see how to get resources from
the deeper parts of the ocean floor. In the meantime,
the dispute revolves around the very few sites suitable for development today, he said.16 In addition,
there is absolutely no guarantee that in 50 years, oil
and gas will play the same important role in the global
economy as they do now.
The revival of the Northern Sea Route was one of
the ideas that preoccupied Russian President Vladimir Putin for all of the past decade. A campaign advertising the would-be glamorous prospects for Arctic
navigation was one of the first electoral ploys when
he was acting president. In April 2000, addressing
a special conference on the Northern Sea Route and
Russian shipbuilding convened on board the Arktika
nuclear icebreaker in Murmansk, Putin gave assurances that the volume of cargo shipments in the Arctic
might reach more than 10 million tons a year in the
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not-so-distant future, while the actual volume barely
exceeded a million tons at the time.
Putin named several factors calling attention to
the Northern Sea Route. He said that Russia needed
“a state navigation policy, and the Arctic transport
system offers a perfect testing range for that.” He also
stated that “the North has the riches that may soon be
needed not only by Russia, but by all of humankind as
well.” That is why “Northern territories are our strategic reserve for the future.” This led him to the logical
conclusion that “the Northern Sea Route is an important factor for ensuring the state’s security.”17
In reality, the Northern Sea Route still remains
Russia’s internal navigation passage that is used, at
the very most, for transporting short-haul export resources, metal ores, and hydrocarbons. Hopes for
using this route for transit cargo shipments between
Europe and Asia were short-lived, and the discussions
of the prospects for the Northern Sea Route have been
down-played of late even in Russia itself. Vyacheslav
Ruksha, general director of “Atomflot” and ex-director of the Federal Marine and River Transport Agency, admitted in public that cargo shipments along the
Northern Sea Route cannot be profitable at the moment because this passage includes sections like the
Sannikov Strait and Vilkitsky Strait, which are a mere
17 meters or so deep. This limits the tonnage of cargo
ships, making the southern route between Europe and
Asia, although it is longer, much less expensive due
to the greater tonnage of transiting ships. “Transport
activity on the Northern Sea Route is a sensitive indicator of the economy of the state,” Vyacheslav Ruksha
insists. “In the Soviet years, we transported 7 million
tons of cargo, by the end of the century, only 1.4 million. Now freight traffic has exceeded 2 million and
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continues to grow.”18 Until now, passage of goods
along the Northern Sea Route has been unprofitable!
Such became clear even from the triumphant report
to Putin by Sergei Frank, head of Sovkomflot, Russia’s
largest ocean carrier. According Frank, the throughtraffic Northern Sea Route would not be started in full
until the summer of 2010. At that time, Russia was expected to exercise only some “pilot runs,” which he
referred to as “innovation challenges.” Furthermore,
it was quite possible, he said, that “we will sail north
of the New Siberian Islands, as there are certain restrictions on planting in the Laptev Strait and the Sannikov Strait.”19
But that requires other ships. Ruksha said that
fair prospects still existed in shipping in the Central
Arctic rather than along the Northern Sea Route. This
has a hitch, too, as completely new powerful transport
ships and icebreakers will be needed, as “the ice there
is completely different.”20
As for the new ships, the situation is bleak. It is
true that Russia has the biggest icebreaker fleet. The
problem is that the Russian fleet has seven rapidlyaging nuclear icebreakers that facilitate navigation
along the Northern Sea Route. Even considering all
the imaginable extensions of service life, the Arktika
has practically exhausted its service life; the Rossiya is
also in its death throes; the Taimyr may last until 2013;
the Vaigach and the Sovietsky Soyuz until 2014; and the
Yamal until 2017. The Fifty Years of Victory icebreaker
that the Murmansk shipping line commissioned in
2007 can just barely be considered a new one, since its
construction at the Baltic Shipyards in St. Petersburg,
Russia, dragged on for almost 20 years. This means
that it, too, belongs to the old family of icebreakers.
The only achievement is the recent launch of the tank-
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er Kirill Lavrov, which is said to be capable of breaking
ice up to 1 to 2 meters thick. An unpleasant fact was
mentioned very frankly by such a “pro-imperialist”
figure as Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov:
Only one company is engaged in ice shipbuilding,
[and] there are very few icebreaking ships that were
launched. As he did 10 years ago, Vladimir Putin still
demands that the management of the shipbuilding industry develop a multiyear program.
But even if there is an opportunity for access to lucrative transit routes and to the deposits of natural resources, the question remains whether Russia has the
tools to use them. Assuming that the ice will disappear
(there are still no oil production technologies on the
drifting ice), Russia does not have the technology for
deep water oil production. Lately in the Arctic seas not
even a single parametric well was drilled.21

Unfortunately, the absence of rational reasons for
the confrontation over Arctic access does not always
exclude the possibility of confrontation. At present,
Russia is showing (at least in words) the intention to
strengthen its military capabilities in the Arctic region.
Does Russia have any opportunities to do so?
First of all, one should keep in mind that the military dimension always played a key role in the development of the Arctic region. Beginning at least in the
1930s, the Soviet and then Russian military have been
the overlords of the Arctic, although the role that was
attached to the region in the country’s strategic security would fluctuate depending on the foreign policy
context. The Soviet authorities looked at the Arctic
from different angles. During World War II, communication lines linking the Soviet Union with its allies
in the anti-Nazi coalition were laid in the Arctic region. After the Cold War began, the Arctic became the
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front line in an imaginary nuclear war with the United
States, as it was in the Arctic that Soviet strategists expected the approach of strategic bombers or ballistic
missiles from across the North Pole. Testing grounds
(Novaya Zemlya, Plesetsk, and Nenoksa) where the
Soviet Union, as a nuclear superpower, tested its armaments were also located in deserted Arctic regions.
The Basics of State Policy of the Russian Federation in
the Arctic Region, Russia’s main national Arctic doctrinal document, which the Russian government endorsed in 2001, concentrated on military issues much
more than did the 2008 document. It insisted that “all
types of activity in the Arctic are tied to the interests
of defense and security to the maximum degree.”
The list of priorities features as Item #1 the “reliable
functioning of the Russian Navy’s group of strategic
sea-based nuclear forces deployed there for deterring
the threats of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies.” Item #2 is “reliable control over
the state border of the Russian Federation and Arctic
maritime areas in order to defend the Russian Federation’s national interests in the region.”22
Ironically, in the 1990s, which was a period of total decay of Russian armed forces, the Arctic region
had a military role. The ensuing shrinkage of national
nuclear arsenals has led to a situation in which seabased nuclear forces became Russia’s main instrument
of deterrence over the short term. While Soviet-era
Moscow put the main emphasis on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), in the 1990s
submarines formed the backbone of Russian security.
Furthermore, the aim of making Russian submarines
invulnerable rested on the concept of the so-called
“Strategic Northern Bastion.”
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This concept flowered in the Russian Defense Ministry in 1992. Its authors believed that a sharp drop in
Russia’s defense capability simultaneously in all theaters of naval operations and scarce finances allocated
for defense programs made it necessary to concentrate the main group of nuclear forces in the Northern
Fleet, which operates in the Arctic. It suggested the
concealment of submarine missile cruisers from an
adversary under the meters-thick Arctic ice, as Russian nuclear submarines would become the enemy’s
natural targets in case of an armed conflict. The Arctic
looked like an ideal region for erecting this bastion for
another reason: Russia had obvious advantages over
other countries in that it had many years of experience
in scientific research in sub-polar waters.
Attempts to create the Strategic Northern Bastion
enjoyed such a priority that even during the economic
crisis of the 1990s, the Northern Fleet received some
funding. As a result, in the most difficult period for
the Russian armed forces, the Northern Fleet obtained
the nuclear cruiser Peter the Great. Today, the Northern
Fleet is the most effective component of Russia’s Navy
(two-thirds of Russian naval power is concentrated in
the Northern Fleet). All the bases of the Northern Fleet
are located in the Arctic region: Severomorsk, Polaryarnoye, Gadzhievo, Ostrovnoye, Nerpichya Guba,
Olenya Guba, Sayda-Guba, Bolshaya Lopatka, Iokange (Gremikha), Granite, and Vidyaevo. A marine
infantry brigade is located in Sputnik and Pechenga.
Forces of the Northern Fleet are comprised of
11 strategic submarines, 3 nuclear submarines with
cruise missiles, 6 nuclear torpedo submarines, 38
I rank ships, 20 II rank ships, 19 III rank ships, 130
boats, and the marine infantry brigade with 74 tanks
and 209 artillery systems. Northern Fleet aviation

54

had 20 Tu-22Ms (bombers), 12 Su-25s (FGA), 24 Su27s (FTR), 2 An-12s, 25 An-12s/An-24s/An-26s (TPT),
and 27 Ka-27s/Ka-29s (ASW helicopters).23 Apart from
the Northern Fleet Russian sector, the Arctic is a zone
of responsibility divided among the four military
districts: the Leningrad Military District, from Pechengi (Murmansk region) to Ust-Kora (Arkhangelsk
region); the Volga-Urals Military District, from Yar to
the island Olenyi (Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District); the Zone of the Siberian Military District, from
Leskinen to Kozhevnikovo (Krasnoyarskyi Krai); and
the Far East Military District, from the island of Bolshoi Begichev (Republic of Sakha Yakutia) to Anadyr
(Chukotkyi Autonomous District).
Most of the Russian armed forces and resources in
the Arctic region are located mainly in the Murmansk
region (two motorized rifle brigades). The Central Test
Ground (Novaya Zemlya), where nuclear weapons
were tested, and the main center for missile testing
(Plesetsk) are in the Arkhangelsk region. Monitoring
stations of the Space Forces are on the Novaya Zemlya
and in Plesetsk and Naryan-Mar. Long-Range Aviation forces use airfields in Rogachevo (Novaya Zemlya) and Vorkuta.24
Some support units of the Strategic Missile Forces
are located in the northern zone of the Volga-Urals
Military District (Nenets Autonomous District). A
station for monitoring ICBM trajectories is located in
Noril’sk (the northern zone of the Siberian Military
District troops). An airfield for long-range aviation is
also located in Norilsk.25 Stations for ICBM launches
monitoring are located in Yakutsk and Mirny (Far
Eastern Military District). The 72th Fighter Regiment
is also located in Amderma (Anadyr) in the Far Eastern Military District and an anti-electronic warfare
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(AEW) regiment is in Pechora Kamenka. Airfields
for Long-Range Aviation are located in Chekurovka,
Tiksi-3, and Anadyr.26
It is important to mention that all the foregoing data
relate to the period before 2009. One can suppose that
now, when the number of units of ground forces has
been reduced by a factor of 11, and Navy and Air Force
units by a factor of two, number of Russian troops in
the Arctic has also been reduced. The information is
rather contradictory. On one hand, newspapers insist
that Russia at least partially restored the garrisons
in the places where they were previously stationed
such as Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya, but in
reduced numbers.27 On the other hand, it was mentioned at the hearings in the Federation Council that
“airfields for long-range strategic bombers at Anadyr,
Vorkuta, and Tiksi will be closed in the near future as
part of military reform.”28
Some idea of Russia’s current military presence
is given in official information by the MOD on the
amount of supplies for the winter northern garrisons.29
But does presence mean that Russia will be able to back
their claims with military force? In fact, the entire military presence (most of it is Navy) is concentrated only
on the Kola Peninsula; all the rest of the huge space up
to the Chukotka strip has no combat units. The construction of the modern border complex “Nagurski”
on the archipelago, Zemlya Franza Josefa (Franz Josef
Island) should be followed by the creation of similar
complexes on Wrangel Island and then all across the
Arctic coast. The first time in many years that border
patrol ships traversed the Northern Sea Route in the
Chukotskoye Sea was in 2008.
The United States can use the ships of the Atlantic
Fleet as well as the Pacific Fleet in the Arctic region.
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It has 30-40 combat ships, including aircraft carriers,
attack submarines, and destroyers. The Norwegian,
Danish, and Canadian navies together have four destroyers, 30 frigates, and 11 submarines. Their navies
are trained to conduct warfare in the Arctic region.
NATO forces can rely on a powerful system of
bases, while the Russian Northern Fleet can base only
on the Kola Peninsula. The superiority of NATO in
the air, too, is clear: the carriers it has transport 400
combat aircraft. The Admiral Kuznetsov carrier has on
board only 12 aircraft. There also is a land-based Tu22M3 regiment, an anti-submarine squadron, and an
anti-submarine helicopter regiment. Ground forces
operating east of the Barents Sea and Novaya Zemlya
in fact have no bases nor prospect of ground and air
support. Russian forces are thus insufficient if authorities are seriously thinking in terms of a possible military confrontation. It has become obvious that Russian
military potential in the Arctic is much lower than the
united potential of the NATO countries. Experts insist
that Russia has to establish an additional fleet which
can control its northern coast from the Urals to west
of Chukotka. Possible areas of responsibility of such a
fleet are the eastern part of the Kara Sea, Laptev Sea,
and the eastern part of the East Siberian Sea, with locations in Dixon, Khatanga, and Tiksi.
Fortunately, there is no sign of the development of
such a fleet. It is no coincidence that soon after the announcement of the intention to “create a force for the
Arctic,” Moscow pretty soon back-pedaled. Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov declared:
We do not intend to increase our armed presence in
the Arctic. Decisions being adopted to strengthen the
capabilities of the coast guard are important for rescue
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operations in these areas. There are no plans to introduce any extra armed forces in addition to the regular
units performing their functions.30

Obviously, the creation of Arctic troop complements does not advance the new image of the armed
forces (as Russian leadership prefers to describe a
radical military reform). It is a clear example of the
contradiction between the realistic plans for a military
buildup, which orients the conventional armed forces
toward local conflicts, and the militaristic rhetoric of
the Kremlin underlining the willingness of Russian
armed forces to participate in a confrontation with
NATO countries.
But even if Russia has managed not only to restore
the combat potential of the Soviet armed forces, but
even to raise it dramatically, that fact can hardly help
advance Russia’s territorial claims. All Soviet and then
Russian military infrastructure has been established
to provide nuclear deterrence. However, the ability to
launch a nuclear strike against the United States adds
little to the ability to defend the interests of Russia
in the Arctic. That is a fundamentally different military task. Ironically, these two tasks contradict each
other.31 Moreover, I suspect that any Russian attempt
to use military force to achieve its stated goals in the
Arctic has no rational explanation. In that region, the
interests and claims of the United States, Canada,
Denmark, Norway, and Russia are in mutual conflict.
For example, the United States has territorial disputes
with Canada, Russia has disputes with Norway. With
each country focused on its own interests, Moscow
has much room to maneuver for it may enter into alliances with one against the other, to compromise, or
pursue its own goals. However, this diplomatic game
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is possible only as long as Russia desists from threatening its opponents with military force. But as soon
as it dares to use military threats, arrangements of
collective defense of NATO countries will inevitably
be activated. Instead of bargaining and making tactical alliances with individual countries, Russia will be
forced to confront a united front of Western countries.
Thus, on the one hand, the wealth of the Arctic appears to be at least questionable. On the other hand,
military force cannot bolster Russia’s claim. A cold
war in the Arctic is unthinkable. We therefore ask why
Moscow has pursued a confrontational approach with
such persistence, attracting worldwide opprobrium
in the process. One reason is that other Arctic nations have signaled their willingness to use force. The
United States and Canada regularly conduct military
exercises in the Arctic region. Denmark has planned
to develop special Arctic military units. All sides have
exaggerated their readiness for military confrontation.
In my opinion, today the Arctic is an ideal field for
the expression of great power ambitions. It allows politicians to grab the headlines and demonstrate their
patriotism to voters. The Arctic is a region where the
interests of Moscow and Washington, former global
adversaries, clash at least theoretically. Thus, the Arctic is a great stage on which to play a parody of the
cold war. Indeed, the entire foreign policy of Russia
is now a parody of its foreign policy during the Cold
War era. It is the international policy of Vladimir Putin. In his famous “Munich” speech, Putin as much as
suggested to the West that Russia would play the role
of the Soviet Union and even the Warsaw Pact. Putin
insisted that the basis of its relationship with the West
still lay in the military balance. This confrontation
should remain solely rhetorical (in the last 10 years,
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there has been no real step that could be interpreted
as a threat to the West). But such a pose as Putin’s requires the creation of situations in which maintaining
a military balance would make some sort of sense. At
the present time, such sense applies primarily in the
sphere of strategic weapons. However, due to the rejection by the Obama administration of U.S. deployment of strategic missile defense elements in Poland
and the Czech Republic, as well as U.S. agreement to
concluding a new treaty on strategic offensive armaments, the number of opportunities to simulate a military confrontation greatly narrowed. In this situation,
the Arctic appears to be an ideal field in which to rattle
the militaristic saber.
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CHAPTER 3
RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE HIGH
NORTH:
PROJECTION OF POWER AND CAPACITIES
OF ACTION
Marlène Laruelle
At a time when large scientific expeditions are
scarce, the conquest of the Arctic brings back an air of
romantic adventure to great power discourse, but also
signals the return of nationalist rhetoric. The phenomenon is not unique to Russia. Ottawa, Canada, also
seems to build the Arctic as a new Canadian flagship.
The decision—approved almost unanimously by the
House of Commons in spite of protests from northern
Inuit communities—to change the name of the Northwest Passage to the “Canadian Northwest Passage”
confirmed the state susceptibility in respect to territorial sovereignty in the Arctic.1 In Russia, the conquest
of the High North is an identity-building project.2 The
president’s special representative for cooperation in
the Arctic and Antarctic, famous polar explorer and
member of United Russia, Arthur Chilingarov, does
not hesitate to celebrate Russian ambitions in the Arctic. During the Polar Year 2007, leading the highly
publicized Russian expedition to the North Pole, he
planted a Russian flag on the seabed of the Arctic, asserting rights for those who arrive first,3 while in 2009,
he again said it bluntly that “we will not give the Arctic to anyone.”4
Verbose rhetoric aside, taking into account the realities of climate extremes makes players much more
modest and hesitant than they wish to admit. The
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dominance of the Arctic, in addition to questions of
the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples,
poses a real technological, human, and financial challenge. The economics of this venture have not yet
been demonstrated and depend on long-term climatic
changes that are difficult to measure and cannot really
be assessed until the time frame 2020-30. For Moscow,
however, the issue remains crucial: its future as an
energy great power is an Arctic future. For the past
few years, Russia has thus faced a revival of strategic
thinking on the High North. Behind the nationalisttinged discourse, which is fairly aggressive towards
the West, Russia’s goals are far more pragmatic: attempts to reform the army, upgrade the navy, modernize the Northern Fleet, increase civil-military cooperation, and resurrect the shipyard sector. The traditional
Russian gaps between rhetoric and reality, and power
projection and actual capabilities, are especially important since the Arctic is uncharted territory.
RUSSIA’S NEW STRATEGIC THINKING ABOUT
THE ARCTIC
The High North occupies a very specific place in
Russian defense strategy. Since the 1950s, this region
has been host to key industries and infrastructure related to the Russian nuclear deterrent, particularly the
installations on the Kola Peninsula, which have to be
secured. The High North also guarantees access to the
Atlantic Ocean and is therefore vital to the Russian
Navy, which it needs for its international missions, especially since Russia lost several ports in the Baltic Sea
and the Black Sea (Paldiski in Estonia and the question
of Sevastopol in the Ukraine) following the breakup
of the Soviet Union. The High North borders Norwe-
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gian and Danish zones under North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) control in which the North Alliance conducts simulation exercises that the Kremlin
interprets as “aggressive.” Lastly, the High North has
a symbolic significance concerning Russia’s status as a
great power. The Stalinist myth of the Northern Maritime Route, Sevmorput’, used in the 1930s and 1940s
to exert Russia’s military and industrial prowess, is
reemerging today.5 Above all, energy interests linked
to the exploitation of sub-sea and continental shelf resources have profoundly revived the region’s strategic importance.6
The revival of strategic interest in the High North
materialized in the early 2000s, with an initial strategy for the Arctic published in 2001 but hardly implemented, and then a report completed in 2004 by the
Russian State Council Working Group on National Security Interests in the North. During his second term,
Vladimir Putin increased his references to the important role of the region. Several texts were adopted: a
new Russian maritime doctrine until 2020; a policy
plan for naval construction; a development plan for
naval transport in Russia; a development plan for the
fishing industry; the foundations for Russian policy in
the field of maritime military activities; and a defense
strategy for state borders, inland waters, territorial
seas, the continental shelf, and the exclusive economic
zones of Russia. The Maritime College, meanwhile, is
in charge of changing Russian strategic thinking. The
new Russian maritime doctrine includes a naval fleet,
merchant shipping, a fishing fleet, and research vessels, in a holistic approach to the exploitation of the
sea. In September 2008, a new strategy for the Arctic
through 2020 was adopted, and Dmitri Medvedev
explicitly portrayed the Arctic as a base for Russian
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natural resources in the 21st century.7 The National
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020,
released in May 2009, underlines the battle that is taking place for energy resources, considered to be the
potential means for Russia to remain a great power.
The document confirms Russia’s interest in the Arctic,
which is elevated to the status of the Caspian Sea and
Central Asia, as one of the main energy battlegrounds
of the future.
On the strategic level, in the summer of 2008, Russia changed course, confirming it was expanding its
current level of operations in the Arctic. The Russian
Navy announced that its fleet was resuming a warship
presence in the Arctic, and ever since military ships
have patrolled near Norwegian and Danish defense
zones. The stakes are fundamental since the Russian fleet cannot enter the Atlantic except by passing
through specific choke points, two being the junction
of Greenland, Iceland, and Norway, and the junction of Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom.8
Moscow has paid particular attention to the situation
in the Svalbard archipelago, which it interprets as indicative of global tensions between NATO and Russia. The Russian Army therefore wants to increase its
protection of the Russian settlement at Barentsburg
and provide more effective protection for Russian
fishermen, who are often arrested by the Norwegian
navy. In the summer of 2008, Russian military exercises were organized close to Spitzbergen involving
the cruisers Marshall Ustinov and the Severomorsk, with
the plan now being to hold these exercises at regular
intervals. Director of National Fisheries (Goskomrybolovstvo) Andrei Krainin has asked the armed force to
give “psychological support” to Russian fishermen
navigating close to Norwegian waters.9 The Russian
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Navy is also increasing the operational radius of the
Northern Fleet’s submarines, and under-ice training
for submariners is becoming a priority task. Naval activism in the Arctic is accompanied by a new dynamics in aviation. In 2008, strategic bombers flew over the
Arctic for the first time since the end of the Cold War.
Two Ty-95s, based in Saratov on the Engels aviation
base with inflight refueling capability, now regularly
patrol the Arctic.10 These over-flights drew criticism
from Canada, which has accused them of coming too
close to Canadian territory. Two new aircraft squadrons are apparently going to be created to supervise
naval operations in the Arctic.
Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov, director
of the Central Directorate of Military Training and
Troop Services (GUBD) at the Ministry of Defense,
announced plans to establish an Arctic special forces
unit (spetsnaz) to support Russia’s northern policy. To
justify his decision, he made reference to the North Region-2008 exercise undertaken by the United States in
Alaska, which involved more than 5,000 military personnel.11 The current administrative apportionment
within the Defense Ministry is going to be reviewed
so that specialized sections can be created to cover the
High North. This process will involve regrouping of
sections of the troops placed with the military districts
of Leningrad, Siberia, and the Far East within a future
Arctic district. These troops are going to have to be
particularly mobile, will probably have an icebreaker
assigned to their unit, and are due to be operational by
2016. Moreover, the Institute of the Armed Forces at
Ryazan could be endowed with an “Arctic faculty” for
training new specialists.12 Provisions will likely also
be made to strengthen FSB control over the region to
deal with the new threats that have arisen because of
the exploitation of the continental shelf and the pro67

liferation of maritime traffic: border control systems,
the introduction of special visa regulations to certain
regions, and the implementation of technological controls over fluvial zones and sites along the northern
maritime route.13
However, as General Shamanov is known for his
provocative declarations, these statements are difficult
to interpret because they took place within a framework of ideological escalation. The usual difficulties
of the Russian army to put into practice these calls for
change suggest that the birth of Arctic brigades will
probably be a long and chaotic administrative process.
RUSSIA’S NEW NAVAL AMBITIONS
The strengthening of Russian military presence in
the High North is closely linked to the new naval ambitions of Russia. The Russian Navy hopes to become
the second most powerful in the world in 20 to 30 years.
In 2008 and 2009, Moscow displayed its former Soviet
traditions by organizing several long-range cruises,
the most numerous since the fall of the Soviet Union,
in different parts of the world, for example, sending
the nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser Peter the
Great to the Mediterranean and Caribbean seas, South
Atlantic, and the Indian oceans. The modernization
of the Russian Navy is based on the construction of a
new fleet of nuclear submarines, the abandonment of
single-function vessels in favor of multipurpose and
more mobile ones, and the production of six squadrons of aircraft carriers, which would propel the Russian Navy to second in the world in terms of combat
capability. However, this phase of construction will
not begin until 2015 and will be extremely costly,
making its implementation iffy and dependent on the
global economic performance of the country.14
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Moreover, these naval ambitions should be viewed
in the context of the modernization troubles experienced by the Russian Army. The money that has
been pumped into the military sector during Vladimir Putin’s two terms—the army’s budget increased
500 percent in 8 years—does not in itself constitute
reform. On the contrary, there was a partial return to
the pathologies of the Soviet Army.15 The military elite
has had difficulties in understanding the stakes of recruiting conscripts in a country in full demographic
crisis and of accepting the idea of alternative service
and professional recruitment. Hazing (dedovshchina)
goes largely unpunished, corruption among officers is
massive, professionalism and discipline are in decline,
and the quality of military tactics in difficult terrain
has not improved between Afghanistan and the two
wars in Chechnya.
For more than 2 decades, Russian military doctrines have been rather vague about how to define the
enemy, oscillating between the West in general and
NATO in particular, on the one hand, and the small
separatist movements and international terrorism
on the other. Russia’s definition of the enemy brings
with it fundamental military decisions, particularly
concerning the ability to change to a professional
army, which would be smaller but better trained and
equipped. The reform plan announced at the end of
2008 anticipates a large transformation of the Russian
Army to fewer men who are more mobile, better educated, and better equipped. For this, the officer corps
is set for a reduction on the order of 150,000-200,000
men by 2012.16 Those separated will be transferred to
the reserves. However, this modernization is coming
along slower than expected, raising doubts from some
parts of the Ministry of Defense.
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Within the armed forces, the navy had been the
biggest loser from the drastic reduction of military
budgets in the 1990s. It saw its share of the defense
budget drop from 23 percent to 9 percent. In addition,
the objectives mentioned in the two state programs to
modernize the armed forces (1996-2005 and 2001-10)
were never achieved. The third State Program for the
Armed Forces (2007-15) finally signaled the return of
the navy and its symbolic and financial reassessment.
For the first time in several decades, it has been placed
on an equal footing with other services, and onequarter of the budget is dedicated to building new
ships. However, this number seems insufficient. It can
support the construction of two or three new nuclear
submarines, but those currently in service also have
urgent repair needs.17 Moreover, in 2008, the state allocated only 10 percent of the sum necessary for these
repairs.18
Russian shipyards have long lacked public funding, are based on old technologies, and are too oriented toward the military, while civilian industry is
in greater demand. To remedy this imbalance, the
government has planned investments of more than
170 billion rubles ($5.5 billion) for the development
of shipyards between 2010 and 2015, according to the
official text on the main directions of state industrial
policy and its realization in the field of shipbuilding.
This is indeed one of the three priority areas the Kremlin has identified to revive domestic industry, along
with aviation and space.
Modernization of the Russian Navy is a strategic
imperative for the High North and the Pacific Fleet,
and the Khabarovsk, Nikolaevsk on Amur, and Komsomolsk on Amur shipyards. All of the Russian fleets
have a desperate need for coastal vessels, especially
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corvettes, the shortage of which endangers the safety
of the Russian coast. The navy must also consider its
needs for new aircraft carriers. As in Europe and the
United States, technological needs have become more
complex, and the trend is toward more versatile hardware. The revival of shipbuilding is very costly and
demanding in terms of technology and know-how.
Russia will likely suffer a lack of vessels, mainly coastal, for several years; old ones will be decommissioned,
with new ones not yet out of the yards.
MODERNIZING THE NORTHERN FLEET AND
THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT
The Northern Fleet, based close to Murmansk in
the north of the Kola Peninsula at Severomorsk, remains the most powerful of the four Russian fleets
(Pacific, Baltic, Black Sea, and Caspian). It contains
the largest number of icebreakers and nuclear submarines; about two-thirds of the Russian Navy’s nuclear
force is based there. It is in charge of all operations in
the Atlantic and is thus able to venture as far as the
Caribbean or to conduct anti-pirate operations close
to the Gulf of Aden.
The Northern Fleet was hit hard by the fall of the
Soviet Union. In 1986, it comprised some 180 nuclearpowered submarines of different classes, while today
it has been reduced by three-quarters to just 42. In addition, its history is marked by several failures. A total
of four submarines have sunk, including the Kursk in
2000, and its ballistic missile launches regularly fail.
The fleet also faces numerous problems related to its
aging vessels, the naval nuclear fuel cycle, the disposal of radioactive waste, and contamination issues. The
naval nuclear reactors concentrated in this region are
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dangerous, many of the nuclear submarines waiting
to be decommissioned are poorly secured, and large
amounts of nuclear waste remain stored on vessels
specially designed for dumping at sea.19 Approximately 25,000 spent fuel assemblies removed from submarines are located at Northern Fleet facilities, mostly
at Andreyeva Bay and Gremikha, then shipped and
loaded into rail containers for processing at Mayak.
Since 2001, Atomflot has been overseeing a liquid radioactive waste processing facility. Even if tens of new
containers are being financed by the Arctic Military
Environmental Cooperation (AMEC) project,20 the situation remains fragile on the environmental level and
greatly concerns Russian’s northern neighbors.
The Northern Fleet has close to 80 operational ships
of different categories, while 30+ are being repaired or
are on stand-by.21 Their average age is 20 years. The
fleet’s nuclear-powered submarines consist of 11 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), four cruise missile
submarines (SSGNs), and about 20 multipurpose attack submarines (SSNs). It also has six missile cruisers, which Russia sees as key elements in the restoration of the strategic bastion concept in the Arctic. The
Northern Fleet has two flagships at its disposal, the
largest nuclear icebreaker in the world, Fifty Years of
Victory, and the main nuclear-powered guided missile
cruiser (TAKR), Peter the Great. After the success of the
Peter the Great around the world, in the fall of 2009, the
Ministry of Defense announced that it would take two
heavy nuclear-powered missile cruisers, the Admiral
Lazarev and the Admiral Nakhimov, out of commission.
The fourth ship in this class, the Admiral Ushakov, is
currently undergoing modernization in Severodvinsk
and may rejoin the active fleet. Currently, the Admiral
Kuznetsov and the Admiral Nakhimov operate with the
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Northern Fleet, each of which hosts 20 planes on board
and 10 anti-submarine helicopters. Three new carriers are scheduled to be built and could be assigned
to the Northern and the Pacific Fleets.22 Another antimissile cruiser, the Vice-Admiral Kulakov, only recently
repaired, was integrated into the Northern Fleet in
January 2010.23 The naval aviation includes 200 combat planes and 50 helicopters. As with the other fleets,
the Northern is severely lacking in costal ships and
frigates able to conduct rapid intervention operations.
Several are currently under construction, but the waiting times are problematic insofar as they reduce the
fleet’s protection capabilities.24
The older sea-based nuclear deterrent is in the process of being modernized. Today, the Russian Navy
has six operational Delta II and six Delta IV strategic
submarines that form the sea-based arm of its strategic nuclear deterrent. There are no plans to renovate
the older Delta III class submarines, which were built
during the 1980s, and they will be decommissioned in
the coming decade. Six Delta IVs are being modernized: they will be equipped with a new sonar system
and the new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
Sineva, a third-generation liquid-propelled ICBM that
entered service in 2007.25 On October 11, 2008, during
Northern Fleet military exercises, a Sineva rocket was
fired from the nuclear submarine Tula, reaching its longest range yet, more than 11,500 kilometers.26 Russia is
planning to equip its Delta IV class submarines with
at least 100 Sineva missiles, capable of carrying either
four or ten nuclear warheads. This system enables
missiles to be launched from under the ice, while remaining invisible to hostile observation satellites until
the last moment.27 The Delta IV’s operational life cycle
should last until 2030. In January 2010, the Northern
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Fleet received a vessel in this category called Karelia,
which has been modernized to augment its tactical
and technical capabilities and has been equipped with
Sineva ballistic missiles.28
Many Typhoon-class strategic submarines—the
world’s largest, built in the 1980s—will also be rearmed to carry long-range cruise missiles. For the moment, only the Dmitri Donskoy, has been modernized
and placed with the Northern Fleet. Today, it serves to
conduct test firing for the Bulava system, a new generation solid-fuel SLBM built to avoid possible future
U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) weapons, and
which can travel more than 8,000 km. In the future,
the Typhoons will be replaced with the new Borey-class
nuclear-powered strategic submarines (Project 955).
The first Borey-class submarine, the Yuri Dolgoruky,
laid down in 1996, was placed with the Northern
Fleet, while two others, the Alexander Nevsky and
the Vladimir Monomakh, are being constructed at the
Severodvinsk shipyard.29 This new generation is almost undetectable at deep ocean depths and is used
for multipurpose attacks. Thanks to its armaments,
several types of cruise missiles and torpedoes, it will
be able to carry out diverse missions, chase enemy aircraft carriers, and deliver massive missile strikes on
coastal targets.30 Eight of them are to be constructed by
2020 to replace the old Delta III, Delta IV, and Typhoonclass submarines.
However, a long string of unsuccessful test launches (six out of 11 have failed) has called into question
the future of Russia’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, as
it is expected that the Bulava will be the only Russian
sea-based ICBM after 2020-25. The former head of the
research institute that designed the Bulava and TopolM ballistic missiles, Yuri Solomonov, quit his post but
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stayed on as general designer of the project.31 The costs
for developing the Bulava and the Borey submarines
take up a large part of the military budget, especially
in times of economic crisis, and hamper any real reform of the army. Frozen after several failures, the
tests are scheduled to recommence in the summer of
2010.32 The Northern Fleet now finds itself in a vulnerable situation, since it is most directly affected by the
repeated failures of the Bulava.
GROWING CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
During the Soviet period, the hierarchy of priorities was devoid of all ambiguity. The army controlled
those zones of the High North that were considered
strategic, and companies wanting to exploit resources
were subject to the good will of the Ministry of Defense.
Thus in the 1980s, the idea of transforming Murmansk
into a hub for Siberian oil bound for Western Europe
was blocked by the army. Today, the situation has
changed radically. In the 1990s, the army’s weakness
in comparison to economic groups has altered power
relations, and despite the renaissance of the Russian
military sector, for the Ministry of Defense there can
be no possibility of setting aside the interests of companies like Gazprom, Lukoil, or Norilsk Nickel, which
have powerful backing within the administration and
can counterbalance the military point of view. These
companies, whether public or private, and the army
have come to the pragmatic conclusion that they depend on one another. The civil-military relationship
is therefore in the process of changing profoundly,
motivated not by reasons of principle concerning the
control of civil society over the military, but by pragmatic economic interests that the army accepts or tries
to turn to its own advantage.
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Henceforth, the Northern Fleet is obliged to concern itself with protecting the growing economic interests of the Russian state in the Arctic. The proliferation
of platforms in the sea, not to mention rigs, pipelines,
and terminals on the coastlines, as well as the growth
in maritime traffic, represents a new challenge for the
army. There are many problems. Most oil facilities are
not mobile, forcing the Ministry of Defense to put in
place instruments assuring their protection in case of
interstate conflict. Even if the Russian military considers these risks minimal, the potential for localized conflict must be taken into account. The securing of the
platforms, pipelines, and ships against possible terrorist attacks accentuates the role of the special services
in nontraditional threats. It entails a reorientation of
defense around mobile units that are able to react
rapidly and are equipped with high-technology hardware, all to the detriment of the traditional conception of armed forces that are numerically superior but
slow to get moving. The possible presence of foreign
companies in resource extraction also implies that
non-Russian interests can be involved. In addition,
the presence of a large number of tankers crossing
sensitive zones can impede the circulation of military
ships as well as submarines, which require space to
maneuver and increase the risks of collision. Finally,
the sonar emissions given off by the platforms and the
oil industry interfere with military radar systems.33
Despite having to resolve these new complications,
the Russian army has today become more comprehensive. Its new mission also gives it added weight with
political authorities. The protection of Russian energy
interests is likely to become one of the central elements
in legitimacy for the Northern Fleet. In addition, this
fleet is well-placed to garner material advantages. It
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benefits, for example, from cheaply priced fuel offered
by extraction companies and gets its port infrastructure renovated at the latter’s expense, without having
to use up its own budget. On their side, statements
from the extraction companies are increasingly proarmy, as a symbol of the renewal of Russian power.
They are well aware that they need the support of the
Northern Fleet to implement anti-terrorism protection
systems, obtain the authorization to extract or to circulate in the sea, and access existing port infrastructures,
fuel storage sites, and the large naval construction
sites in the country’s north. The main companies concerned—Gazprom, Lukoil, and Norilsk Nickel—have
to contend, for example, not only with the lack of icefree civil ports, but also with the absence of ports in
deep water that are able to host 300,000-ton tankers.
These companies would also like to take advantage of
the military ships used for hydrographic and hydrometeorological research, incorporating them in a sea
rescue system of extreme logistical complexity.
Many examples attest to this rapprochement of
interests. In 2005, the navy and Gazprom signed an
agreement concerned with the latter’s use of auxiliary
ships, ports, and naval military sites, including setting up a security and rescue system and establishing
maritime routes navigable by tankers, as well as establishing cooperation in terms of LNG.34 This enabled
Gazprom to construct an LNG processing plant for
the Shtokman field in the closed town of Vidyayevo,
a submarine base and garrison on the north shore of
the Kola Peninsula. Further, in 2006, the Ministry of
Defense agreed to provide the Russian industry with
previously classified geological and topological maps.
Since the 1990s, the army has allowed Lukoil arctic
tankers to use a military fuel storage facility at Mokh-
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natkina Pakhta, near Murmansk, but denied the oil
company the right to build a refinery, judging its location too close to military installations. One can therefore note how, despite robust rhetoric concerning the
projection of power, Russian realities force Moscow to
be much more pragmatic. The importance accorded to
the energy sector means issues of the market and profitability tend to be ascendant over security decisions.
The same economic logic is at play in the field of naval
construction.
THE NEW STRATEGIES OF RUSSIAN NAVAL
YARDS
The Russian Arctic program involves four major
naval sites with historical links to the Northern Fleet:
the two sites of St. Petersburg, Severnaia Verf and
the Baltic factory, which are both partners and competitors, as well as the two Severodvinsk shipyards,
Sevmash and Zvezdochka, situated about 30 km from
Arkhangelsk. Moscow’s desire to revive military naval construction can be realized only with the involvement of the civil sector. Since domestic capabilities are
insufficient, the Russian merchant fleet orders 95 percent of its new ships from abroad and only 5 percent
from Russian companies.35 The market that has been
lost by the Russian shipyards is thus immense, and
with it the loss of knowledge. The case is similar for
the fishing fleet, which wishes to renew its navigation
hardware, half of which has exceeded the duration of
its technical life. The most promising domain, however, is for the ships supporting the planned underwater
mineral extraction endeavor on the Arctic shelf. For the
Arctic and the Caspian seas, Russian companies claim
to need 55 extraction platform, floating or submarine
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edifices, 85 transport ships, and 140 auxiliary ships by
2030.36 The main naval military sites, then, have every
interest in diversifying their orders by meeting the expectations of the civil fleet. Moreover, today they are
part of the Ministry of Commerce and Economic Development, and not the Ministry of Defense.
The best example of this public-private cooperation
in naval construction is the construction in St. Petersburg, by 2013 or 2014, of a new shipbuilding complex.
Created for this purpose in 2004, the State Corporation OPK includes both the Severnaya Verf and Baltic
shipyards, and the firm Aisberg (Iceberg), responsible
for the design of new Arctic vessels. Both yards specialize in large nuclear vessels, such as Fifty Years of
Victory, and have also recently built two diesel-electric
icebreakers, including the Moskva, commissioned by
Rosmorport. They are in charge of the construction of
four Orlan nuclear cruisers and also await orders for
large tankers. OPK cooperates closely with its private
investment counterpart, OSK, which is the property
of Mezhprombank and controlled by Senator Sergei
Pugachev.37 The total cost of the operation, estimated
at 14 billion rubles (465 million dollars), gets state underwriting from Vneshtorgbank and Vneshekonombank. The flagship of this new site will be a floating
bridge, capable of building oil tankers with a capacity
of 300,000 tons and tankers carrying 150,000 to 215,000
m,3 but also of responding to military orders.38 The
Russian government hopes to maintain the expertise
of the Soviet era, acquire new technologies, especially
by collaborating with Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME), and to ensure its autonomy
in terms of military shipbuilding so as not to depend
on exports. Specializing in small coastal vessels, the
new site could theoretically build 30 corvettes, 20 frig-
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ates, six escort squadrons, and 30 auxiliary vessels by
2020. For its part, Gazprom announced an order of
eight gas carriers, the first of which will be operational
in 2013 in order to move production from Shtokman.39
The challenge of this new undertaking is immense in
itself, compounded by the conflicting interests of the
state and the OPK corporation, and competition between Severnaya Verf and Baltic, which continues to
rage.40
By 2020, Russia hopes to double from seven to 14
the number of nuclear icebreakers capable of performing a complete circumnavigation of the North Pole.
The Soviet nuclear icebreakers were built at the Baltic
since 1974. The symbol is the icebreaker Arktika, which
can ensure year-round navigation between Murmansk and Dudinka and extends the shipping season in
Arctic regions. Fifty Years of Victory, left incomplete
by the two St. Petersburg shipyards in 1993, was refueled with nuclear material in 2007. However, to circulate throughout the year along the polar route, Russia needs third-generation icebreakers that are more
powerful and meet the expectations of large energy
companies, which want icebreakers for geological research and exploitation of the seabed. The shipyards
of St. Petersburg therefore specialize in the conquest
program for the Arctic Sea. But the construction of
new nuclear icebreakers is possible only with the participation of the Rosatom State Corporation (Russia’s
atomic energy state corporation). In April 2009, its
director, Sergei Kiriyenko, announced that the level
of government funding for building new nuclear icebreakers would total U.S. $57 million dollars from that
year’s federal budget and another $150 million from
2010-11. Cooperation with Kazakhstan in the nuclear
industry meets the same objective. The joint Russian-
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Kazakh venture Atomnye Stantsii (Atomic Stations)
will manufacture VVER-300 reactors, intended not
only for small nuclear power plants but also for the
new Russian icebreakers. The partnership with Rosenergoatom includes as well the production by Severnaya Verf of spare parts for several new nuclear power
plants ordered for Russia, India, and China.41
In Severodvinsk, the Sevmash shipyard has also
had to reorient itself to civil construction. In the 1990s,
military orders dropped 95 percent, and Sevmash
was able to convert thanks to its dual-use technologies. In 2005, 33 percent of its orders came from the
Ministry of Defense, 30 percent from the oil industry,
and 25 percent from foreign companies. The company
worked with the Indian Ministry of Defense in renovating and modernizing a cruiser aircraft carrier, the
former Admiral Gorshkov, given to India in 2004, and
building diesel-electric submarines for export through
Rosoboronexport.42 For the domestic military industry,
Sevmash mainly deals with repairs to atomic cruisers
like the Admiral Rakhimov and nuclear submarines
like Pantera. Several ships and submarines decommissioned from the Russian army are used at Sevmash
in cooperation programs with the United States and
NATO.43
In terms of civilian seafaring, Sevmash renovated
cruise ships like Alushta, transformed a submarine
into a museum, and built a fish factory for the American company, Sea Wing, as well as several piers, two
floating docks, barges, yachts, and frigates for the
Swedish company, Promar. In 2004, the shipyard won
the largest civil contract in its history for construction
of ten 45,000-ton chemical tankers for the Norwegian
company, Odfjell.44 Gazprom has commissioned a
floating platform for the extraction of oil in shallow
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water. The plant is also involved in the construction
of several other types of platforms destined for the
Pechora Sea or the Shtokman site. It collaborates with
foreign companies such as Conoco, Total, and Halliburton, extracting the Ardalin and Khariagin deposits
in the Nenets autonomous district. Finally, it provides
materiel (pipelines) for oil transit to several national
companies, such as Transneft, some Lukoil subsidiaries, Surgunneftergaz, Yugannedftegaz, and Yukos
Service.45 Lukoil expressed interest in the production
of the shipyard, and Norilsk Nickel wishes to have
its own fleet to move nickel extracted from Yenissei towards Murmansk without using the icebreaker
shuttle transportation from the Murmansk Shipping
Company.
The nearby plant Zvezdochka, the second industry
in Severodvinsk, is more advanced in its civil conversion and even retrained its staff in activities totally
unrelated to its primary expertise, for example, work
on precious stones. To cope with the collapse of the
domestic military command, since 1997 it has initiated cooperation with the Indian Ministry of Defense,
which ordered the modernization and transformation
of three diesel-electric Soviet submarines and two others. The Indian Navy recommissioned one of these,
Sindhuvidjay, in 2007.46 In 2003, Zvyozdochka won the
right to independently conduct business operations
abroad, and since 2008 has been authorized to renovate the 956th escort squadron. With this status, it sold
over 30 million worth of military spare parts to foreign companies in 2009, mainly Indian and Chinese.47
It has also managed to penetrate the market of civilian seafaring. Since the early 1990s, it has won tenders
from Dutch companies like Swets Shipping and Trading and received orders for a series of tugboats from
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Damen Shipyards, and today works closely with Finnish and Norwegian companies. It built metal elements
destined for Statoil, Kvaerner Oil and Gas, and Aker
Solutions platforms, and expanded its partnership
with Moss Maritime, a Norwegian leader in maritime
technology. At home, Zvezdochka works with major
energy companies and is also part of the Union of Producers of Oil and Gas Equipment. The plant is known
for its construction of the 50010 trawler, considered
the best in its class in terms of vessels produced in
Russia. It is also one of the companies allowed to build
new atomic vessels necessary to dominate the Arctic
shelf. As such, it collaborates with Sevmash on several
platform projects and on equipment for extracting oil,
as well as with companies based in the Nenets district.
Finally, in terms of military orders, it has built a series
of carrier vessels for the shallow waters of Barents Sea,
White Sea, and the Sea of Azov. Additionally, the border guard agency has commissioned a series of small
patrol vessels for coastal surveillance.48
CONCLUSIONS
Russian ambitions in the Arctic are quite real, but
they are still far from being realized. On the geopolitical level, Russia will have to contend with the United
States, Canada, NATO, and the Nordic European
states, which seek to affirm their own rights and statuses in the High North. From a strictly military point
of view, the Northern Fleet has experienced major difficulties in modernizing and will have to resolve the
questions emerging from the Bulava failures. In the
economic sphere, the 2008-09 global crisis has put the
brakes on major Russian projects to relaunch naval
construction. From a technical perspective, Gazprom
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and other Russian companies have not yet mastered
the requisite cutting-edge offshore technologies and
will have to continue to work closely with foreign
partners. Despite its Soviet legacy in the Arctic, Russia does not yet have sufficient capability to dominate
that region. The Russian port system is in bad condition, and its polar stations, meteorological and hydrological satellites, and securitization of its navigation
systems are not yet operational. Of the country’s 14
hydrographic ships, 11 have been in operation for over
25 years, and more than 17,000 km of Arctic coastlines
are reportedly not covered by radio, with Russia having to buy information from the United States and
Canada.49 Plans for power projection are therefore far
removed from actual capacity to act. Yet, one cannot
help noting the extent of Russian interest in the Arctic.
The dynamic of military renewal in the region is based
on real economic interests, in which the civil overrides
the military, and pragmatic issues such as technical
capability counterbalance nationalist escalation. Even
if, for the time being, the potential for international
cooperation between the Arctic littoral states does not
have great resonance in Russia, the technological and
financial difficulties faced in High North exploitation
could serve to change this situation. In any case, the
Kremlin is not interested in sacrificing its future as a
great power in the name of international cooperation
in the absence of negotiations, meaningful discussions, or at least symbolic compensations.
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CHAPTER 4
THE EVOLVING ARCTIC SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT:
AN ASSESSMENT
Katarzyna Zysk1
INTRODUCTION
The Arctic2 is no longer like we used to know it,
a politically and economically remote backwater of
international relations. Climate changes in the region,
proceeding at the fastest pace and in the severest form
on the globe, generate a chain of reactions affecting
the region’s geopolitical landscape. As the ice sheet
retreats, new opportunities emerge alongside new security challenges and threats.
However, early enthusiastic predictions about an
unprecedented commercial bonanza in the region
based on an increased accessibility to abundant natural riches and opening of attractive new shipping
lanes have turned out to be too optimistic. Likewise,
predictions about a military conflict in the region, often portrayed as an outcome of a Hobbesian “free for
all” for Arctic energy resources, is proving to be largely overstated.3 The increased international interest in
the region in recent years has led rather to intensification of political processes, in particular among the
countries known as the Arctic 5 (Canada, Denmark
[Greenland], Norway, Russia, and the United States).
One of the outcomes of the strengthened dialogue
was the preliminary agreement between Russia and
Norway, signed in March 2010 after 40 years of negotiations, on delimitation of the resource-rich Barents
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Sea.4 Nevertheless, there are a number of challenges
deriving from transformations in the Arctic’s natural
and, in consequence, its strategic environment, and it
is still not clear how various possible scenarios will
ultimately play out.
The state of the Arctic security environment is analyzed, with focus on economic, jurisdictional, political,
and security processes in the region. Particular attention is devoted to the role of the Russian Federation,
as the country that holds the key to political development in the Arctic in the decades to come. There are
several factors that contribute to that. Russia is one of
the most determined Arctic players, with high ambitions for development of the region. Apart from being the largest polar state from the geographical point
of view, Russia defines the region as crucial for the
country’s economy as a future main base for strategic
natural resources.5 At the same time, despite radical
changes in the Arctic security environment after the
end of the Cold War, the region has never ceased to
play a central role in Russian military strategic thinking and the country’s defense policy.
BACKGROUND: REEMERGENCE OF THE
ARCTIC
With the end of the Cold War, the Arctic has quickly lost its geopolitical significance as one of its major
fronts, characterized by the greatest concentration
of the Soviet Union’s nuclear forces and hosting the
strongest part of its Navy. This concept was embodied in the North in Admiral Sergei Goshkov’s concept
of a strategic bastion. However, since the beginning
of the new millennium and especially over the last 5
years, the Arctic has begun attracting international at-
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tention again. Among the main factors that turned the
world’s eyes toward the region was its representation
as one of the most promising new energy frontiers on
the globe. Much of the focus has been generated by
the U.S. Geological Survey’s World Petroleum Assessment from 2000, which was widely interpreted as attributing 25 percent of the world’s recoverable undiscovered energy resources to the Arctic.6 The Middle
East’s instability and high gas and oil prices from 2004
to the first half of 2008 helped galvanize interest in the
vast, untapped Arctic hydrocarbon deposits.7 Predictions about an upcoming “Arctic Gold Rush,”8 together with alarmist assessments by a large share of the
news media, as well as some experts and academics
who portrayed intrastate relations in this region with
unresolved border lines as virtually chaotic and governed by realpolitik, have also contributed to much of
the international interest.
Furthermore, a more assertive Russian stance, emphasized by a systematic increase in military activity
in the North’s air and maritime domains since 2007,
as well as tough responses to these moves from the
other polar states, have fanned the flames. The sometimes belligerent Russian rhetoric and behavior have
contributed to the perception of Russia as the “wild
card” in the Arctic strategic equation. The 2007 flagplanting episode by the Russian submarine crew on
the seabed under the North Pole—an act with no legal
implications and whose importance was grossly exaggerated—has fueled speculation about an impending
new Cold War with an Arctic epicenter.
The focus on the Arctic has been further prompted
by extraordinary climatic deviations in the region from
apparent historic norms. Global warming has particularly profound consequences in the Arctic because in
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a global context its effects amplify at higher latitudes.9
Arctic warming is thus predicted to be more than twice
the global average (3 to 4 degrees Celsius) in the next
50 years.10 As a result, the ice cap is shrinking and thinning, thus altering the ratio in favor of younger firstyear ice over multiyear ice cover that has survived at
least one summer melt season.11 In 2007 the Arctic sea
ice, monitored by satellite for 3 decades, reached a record minimum.12 In some projections, Arctic late-summer sea ice will virtually disappear by the latter part
of the 21st century.13 Other model simulations suggest
that these estimates may be too conservative, and an
ice-free summer in the region could possibly arrive as
early as in 2030.14
There has been a growing awareness around the
world that the emergence of an ice-diminished Arctic will have both regional and global implications
over the shorter and longer term. The increased international interest has resulted in reports, policies, or
strategies drawn for the region not only by the Arctic
littoral states, but also by international organizations
and actors relatively distant from the region and seemingly with no direct interest. They have been attracted
by the promise of economic opportunities and/or
concerned about potential negative consequences of
these transformations.
Among the most active states that have contributed to the growing international interest in the region
are Norway and Russia. In 2005 the Norwegian government designated the High North15 to be a strategic
priority and presented in the following year a comprehensive strategy for the region.16 Russia’s increased focus on the Arctic has resulted in an updated regional
policy document endorsed in September 2008.17 Also,
the other polar states have expressed their own grow-
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ing interest in Arctic affairs.18 The region has been a
particularly salient issue in Canadian domestic politics and the country’s foreign relations, in particular
with the other polar rim states.19 Although the Arctic
is still a rather peripheral issue in the United States,
the Obama administration focused on the problem of
climate change and improving relations with Russia,
with consequent steadily increased attention to the region.20
Elsewhere, the European Security and Defense
Assembly (WEU) has explored developments in the
Arctic and in November 2008 recommended that the
European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) include the region in their strategies, including attention to the security consequences
of climate change and the receding ice.21 Sharing this
concern, NATO leaders convened in January 2009 to
discuss security prospects and the role of the Alliance
in the High North, while the EU has taken steps towards drawing a comprehensive Arctic policy.22
Furthermore, even Asian countries—notably
China but also India, Japan, and South Korea—have
turned their attention northward. China and South
Korea, along with the EU and Italy, have sought a
permanent observer status in the Arctic Council, although so far unsuccessfully, and their applications
will not be reviewed before the Council’s next meeting this year. China is slowly but steadily recognizing
the commercial and strategic opportunities that may
arise from an ice-free Arctic, first and foremost being
shortened trade routes to European and North American markets and possible access to untapped natural
resources to fuel China’s economy.23 The Chinese government has allocated extra resources for construction
of a new high-tech polar expedition icebreaker and is
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investing in Arctic research.24 Similarly to India, China
has established a permanent research station in NyÅlesund at the Norwegian Svalbard archipelago to
enhance understanding of the evolving Arctic natural
environment.
Even though much of the international focus on
the Arctic has been generated by exaggerated assessments of economic opportunities and security threats,
there is no doubt that multidimensional transformations taking place in the region have the potential to
influence world affairs in a spectrum of areas. The
following sections analyze processes within the main
spheres that have brought the Arctic forth as a geopolitical issue, namely, energy and maritime transport,
legal disputes, and security dynamics.
ARCTIC ENERGY
The Arctic’s oil and gas potential has been widely
discussed. The 2008 Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) portrayed
the region as one of the biggest unexplored energy regions in the world. According to this study, the Arctic
embraces as much as 22 percent of the undiscovered
resources in the world, located mostly offshore (84
percent), and including 13 percent of oil, 30 percent
of natural gas, and 20 percent of natural gas liquids.25
However, the USGS emphasizes that low data
density and high geological uncertainty affects the
accuracy of estimates of the region’s energy reserves.
More research will be necessary to define the resource
potential more accurately. Nevertheless, the Arctic
stands out as one of the most promising energy venues in the world.

96

According to the USGS, the fact that most of the
Arctic gas and oil potential is in the Russian sector
makes that country a key player within regional energy extraction, particularly in case of the projected undiscovered natural gas. More than 70 percent of these
resources is estimated to be in Western Siberia and East
Barents basins, in addition to Arctic Alaska.26 According to official Russian sources, 80 percent of known
Russian gas reserves and 90 percent of hydrocarbon
deposits on the Russian continental shelf are in the
Arctic, 66.5 percent of which is located in the Barents
and Kara Seas.27 Today the Russian regions north of
the Arctic Circle produce as much as 20 percent of the
gross domestic product, 11 percent of gross national
income, and 22 percent of total Russian exports.28 Not
surprisingly, the Russian leadership emphasizes the
importance of the region to the country’s wealth and
competitiveness in the global marketplace as a major
source of revenue crucial for national energy security,
with a direct bearing on Russia’s international standing.29 According to key policy documents recently adopted by Russia, including the Energy Strategy, for the
period up to 2030, development of energy fields in the
Arctic seas and in the Russian northern regions is to
play a stabilizing role by stemming a possible decline
in gas and oil production in Western Siberia expected
between 2015 and 2030.30 Hence, one of the main goals
of Russian Arctic policy is to increase extraction of
natural resources in that region.31
Despite the fact that large parts of the Russian
government and population maintain conservative
attitudes toward the problem of global warming, in
particular toward the role of the human factor, they
expect at the same time that the observed climatic aberrations may create new opportunities for develop-
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ment of certain parts of the national economy, including in the northern regions. Hesitant about tackling
climate change until recently, Russia is devoting more
attention to its expected effects. In December 2009,
prior to the United Nations (UN) Climate Change
Conference in Copenhagen (COP15), President Dmitrii Medvedev signed a doctrinal statement on climate
change. The document points out that much of Russian
territory is located within the region undergoing the
strongest effects of the climatic transformations (both
observed and forecasted).32 Among their expected
negative implications, the document lists an increase
in health problems and death rates in certain parts of
the population; increased frequency and intensity of
extreme floods and fires; melting of the permafrost;
destabilization in ecological balance; and geopolitical tensions caused by migrations.33 However, despite
these challenges and threats, at the same time the Russian authorities expect a number of benefits deriving
from these dynamics, including improved ice conditions for Arctic Sea transport and easier access to and
development of mineral and energy resources on the
continental shelf.34
The projected growth in global demand for energy,
together with diminishing reserves in fields currently
under exploitation, may accelerate calls for extraction
of Arctic gas and oil. Nevertheless, their future development is characterized by high uncertainty and will
be an outcome of a number of factors, including energy prices, technological advances, production from
other energy regions, and developments in the field of
alternative fuels.
Extremely harsh climatic conditions in the Arctic
constitute enormous technological challenges for the
petroleum industry and, together with long distances
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to necessary infrastructure, make the Arctic a highcost region for extraction. The industry will also have
to face environmental concerns, particularly in the
case of oil-spill accidents in the Arctic and elsewhere.
The catastrophic oil spill from an offshore drilling rig
in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, potentially surpassing the damage of the formerly worst oil spill
in history by the Exxon Valdez tanker in 1989, has
already raised calls for a permanent ban on offshore
drilling, and strengthened opposition against opening
the territories near Norway’s Lofoten and Vesteraalen
islands for the oil industry.35 New technologies for
spill response and other crisis management, disaster
relief, and search and rescue capacities suitable for
polar conditions, will have to be provided to enable
these activities to continue. Among decisive factors in
investors’ assessments will be technological progress
and energy prices. Recently, this correlation has been
confirmed in developments in the Russian Shtokman
offshore gas project in the Barents Sea.36 Due to the
negative impact of the global financial crisis on domestic and foreign gas demand and relatively low energy prices, the project has been delayed.37 Russia has
encountered a similar problem in its largest gas field
on the Yamal Peninsula, Bovanenkovo, which had to
be postponed until 2012.38
Other important factors that will have an impact
on the future of the Arctic as a new energy frontier
are developments in the field of increased energy efficiency and alternative fuels. Both may reduce energy
prices and growth in demand for Arctic gas and oil, as
well as reshuffling the map of the world energy market. Development of commercial unconventional natural gas (UNG) resources, such as shale gas from rock
formations, particularly in the United States, is one
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such example. Recent technological advances have
made exploitation of shale gas—previously considered too difficult and too expensive—now easier and
more cost-effective.39 Shale gas extraction has spread
in the United States, transforming the North American natural gas market by leading to oversupply of
natural gas. Together with access to cheap liquefied
natural gas (LNG) from Qatar, it has contributed to a
decrease in the price of gas in this region.40 Although
reliance on shale gas is still in a very early phase in
other parts of the globe, exploration projects are under
way, including Europe.41
Such developments may result in aggravating the
uncertainty regarding the balance between supply
and demand and lead to a shrinking of current markets and lower gas prices. As a result, they may reduce
incentives driving production of Arctic energy deposits, where significant and expensive investments are
necessary.42 According to Deputy Minister for Natural
Resources Sergei Donskoi, due to the delays in development of Arctic offshore fields, Russia has already
lost the U.S. energy market for the gas from Shtokman, and risks losing the European market as well.43
The Russian government has been taking steps to
address these problems. It emphasizes the need to intensify geological surveys in the Arctic seas in order to
more accurately define the energy potential and thus
attract investors. In 2010, all money from the federal
budget allocated for geological study of the Arctic
shelf was used to examine just the Arctic seas.44 The
amounts in question are, however, relatively small,
reportedly up to 30 times less than those projected by
Gazprom and Rosneft before they were cut by 20–30
percent due to the financial crisis.45 Hardship in the
Russian economy contributes to strengthening the
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modernization and reform forces in Russia. The Ministry for Natural Resources and Ecology, as well as the
Ministry of Energy, has spoken in favor of liberalization of access to the offshore energy fields, which are
considered an exclusive state monopoly.46 Minister
for Natural Resources Yurii Trutnev acknowledged,
though, that this idea still faces opposition in certain
parts of the Russian government.47
Although the Arctic in general, and the Russian
sector in particular, stands out as a promising energy
venue, the pace of exploration of offshore fields is likely to remain limited in the immediate future, together
with the human activity and security challenges related to it. Yet, the expected increase in energy consumption worldwide may be generating interest for the
Arctic riches, particularly in energy-thirsty economies
such as China. Although, as argued above, there is a
range of factors militating against interest in energy
production in the Arctic, the future of those factors is
also characterized by high uncertainty.
MARITIME TRANSPORT
Another broadly discussed implication of the retreating ice in the Arctic Ocean is the possibility of
opening new Arctic maritime transport route for
world trade. The opened passages promise to cut transit distances by thousands of miles between some of
the major world markets, making the Arctic an attractive alternative to current trade routes.
The Northern Sea Route (NSR, also called the
Northeast Passage) along the Russian Arctic shoreline
has virtually always been closed to navigation, at least
since 1553. Since 2005, however, it has been open each
summer.48 In 2009 two German ships made the first
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commercial voyage ever through the passage, with
minimal assistance by Russian icebreakers.49
The Northwest Passage (NWP) in the Canadian
Arctic is likely to be the last route to open for commercial traffic according to climatic models, but in
the future it too may offer shorter maritime transport
routes. A third possibility is a passage directly across
the Polar Sea, considered economically and politically
more viable than both the NWP and the NSR although
probably the last to be open due to climatic conditions.50
Nevertheless, there is a host of technical and economic factors that have to be clarified and/or overcome before new trade routes through the polar region become possible and commercially competitive.
Although the Arctic passages offer a considerable
shortcut for shipping between ports located in northern parts of Europe, Asia, and North America as compared to routes using the Suez or Panama Canals, the
savings in distance may not necessarily translate into
savings in time. The high costs of operations in Arctic seas and a range of limitations and uncertainties
such as slower sailing speed may outweigh potential
benefits, limiting the Arctic’s commercial shipping potential.51
Various studies show that the Arctic routes may
be shorter, but not necessarily faster.52 Drifting ice, extreme temperatures, and difficult weather conditions,
as well as polar night and poorly mapped waters, are
among factors that are likely to slow navigation and
thus lengthen transit time. Consequently, the Arctic
passages will not necessarily result in fuel, emissions,
and manpower savings.53 Moreover, the ships will
have reduced cargo carrying capacity, because some
of the Arctic straits are shallow. Nor can the vessels be
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wider than the icebreakers which will have to be used
to open their way through the ice at times. The ships
will also be more expensive as their hulls will have
to be strengthened to withstand the impact of ice. Together with higher insurance premiums necessitated
by the higher risk of sailing in Arctic waters, transport
costs might actually rise. Shipowners and operators
may also be discouraged by an inability to maintain
all-year operations. Finally, it will be impossible to
predict exactly when and for how long the passages
will be open.54
All that said, the routes may still be attractive and
more stable than waters in the south facing challenges
connected to piracy and the associated rapid rise in insurance costs.55 Once the polar routes are established,
there will be an impact on international relations by
redistributing profits among countries and regions,
with some gaining and some losing.56
Russia is among the actors likely to profit most
from an open Arctic in the context of maritime transport. As a country “owning” the NSR, Russia will control new passages of world trade and economics. According to Russian regulations, which may or may not
prevail, all vessels intending to enter the NSR must
give notification in advance to the Russian authorities,
submit an application for guidance, and pay a fee for
icebreaker assistance.57 The Russian government has
expressed strong interest in promotion of the route for
international shipping as a central element in maritime connections between Europe and Asia, all under
Russian jurisdiction.58
The NSR also appears as an alternative for the
transport of Russian Arctic gas and oil. Shipping
through the NRS westward from the Barents and Kara
Seas is expected to increase in the coming years simply
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as a corollary of the development of Russian energy
reserves.59 Russia also plans to ship energy products
though this channel eastward to Asia. In the summer
of 2010, the first ever oil tanker has been scheduled to
sail the entire NSR from the Varandey oil terminal on
the Pechora Sea coast to Japan. The Sovcomflot, Russia’s largest state-owned maritime shipping company
specializing in petroleum and LNG shipping, has announced plans to carry out shipping through the NSR
from the yet-to-be-built LNG plant on the Yamal Peninsula to Asian markets.60 According to some analysts,
Russia aims at increasing its share in export revenues
in the future to preserve the state’s income.61 From this
perspective, the NSR may constitute an important element in Russia’s energy security, understood primarily as security of energy delivery.
However, in this case a variety of conditions has
to be met in order to satisfy requirements of increased
maritime activity. As Russian authorities themselves
note, restructuring the volume of maritime freight
through the NSR requires refurbishing the neglected
infrastructure, building modern harbors, and establishing a system of communications managment. To
secure the Euro-Asian transit, Russia also has to provide support and crisis management capabilities and
must rejuvenate its aging nuclear-powered icebreaker
fleet.62 Maintaining the icebreaker capability will be
crucial for the future of the NSR and economic development of the Arctic. A long-term plan for construction of new third-generation icebreakers was drafted
by the Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation in
2009. However, as with many other ambitious plans
for the Arctic, its implementation has been delayed
due to the financial constraints caused by the global
economic crisis.63
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In the short term, shipping activities in the Arctic
are expected to increase as a result of the exploitation
of the Russian energy deposits in the High North. Together with a likely surge in maritime research and
other scientific activities—as well as Arctic tourism
and to a certain degree the fishing that will follow
changing migratory patterns of fish stocks—these developments will provide regional economic benefits.
But any large-scale trans-Arctic shipping lies in the
long term, and it has an uncertain outcome.
LEGAL ISSUES AND CONFLICT POTENTIAL
Prospects for economic development in the Arctic have shed new light on existing legal disputes in
the region. Most of the public attention has been attracted by the potential overlapping territorial claims
between Denmark and Canada on the one hand, and
Russia on the other. These claims refer to parts of the
Arctic continental shelf around the North Pole. Speculation about the potential for conflict has been based
mainly on the assumption that a struggle for gas and
oil in the disputed areas may lead to the use of military force. The basic flow of the argument stems from
the fact that most of the energy wealth is located in
economic zones subject to the unquestioned national
jurisdiction of the Arctic Ocean states.64 According to
the USGS study, the region around the North Pole and
middle of the Arctic Basin is not among areas with a
high probability of finding petroleum.65
The legal process of extending outer limits of continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles within the
framework of the multilateral legal regime of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea will take years before any conclusion about sovereignty over the Arctic
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seabed is reached. Both Canada and Denmark have
not submitted their claims yet. Russia submitted its
first request in 2001, but the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf requested more evidence.66
The Russian authorities have given a high priority to
the task of defining the limits of its Arctic zone, which
is planned to be accomplished by 2015.67 The question of how Russia may react in case of a denial of its
claim to an extended continental shelf remains open.
It should be remembered, though, that Russia already
exercises unquestioned control over enormous energy
deposits in the Arctic. According to Minister Trutnev,
in today’s terms, Russia has sufficient reserves to cover production for the next 25–35 years, and it does not
include newly discovered reserves.68 Although one
can and should assume that the country will strive to
expand its sovereignty over as much of the new territories and resources as possible, just as the other Arctic states will, Russia is not pressed for time.
In addition to the process of extending continental
shelves, there are three remaining unsettled maritime
borders in the Arctic. As pointed out earlier, one of
the most problematic legal issues in the Arctic and in
Norwegian-Russian relations—the delimitation of the
Barents Sea—has been solved. Two remaining border
issues concern areas with a high probability of finding
hydrocarbon deposits.69 Among them is the CanadianU.S. disagreement in the Beaufort Sea. The problem
has been, however, subjected to a diplomatic process. Moreover, despite existing frictions, a military
confrontation for territory between NATO nations
seems highly remote. The U.S.–Russian dispute about
a maritime border in the Bering and Chukchi Seas
has already been framed in an agreed document and
remains to be ratified by the State Duma.70 The third
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border dispute, between Canada and Denmark, concerns Hans Island—a small uninhabitable 1.3 square
kilometer knoll in the center of the Kennedy Channel
of the Nares Strait. Despite its potential for attracting
the attention of the news media over occasional spectacular gestures by both countries, this disagreement
is the least prone to spur any military confrontation.
Certain challenges are related to Norway’s relations with other states, Russia in particular, in the
200 nautical mile Fishery Protection Zone (FPZ) established by Norwegian authorities around the Svalbard archipelago in 1977.71 Norway has been granted
unquestioned sovereignty over these islands by the
Treaty of 1920, but the treaty has granted to all signatory states, currently 39 nations including Russia,
the right to undertake economic activity at the archipelago.72 According to Norway, the treaty does not apply to the economic zone around it; the other countries
beg to disagree. Due to the different views on the geographical scope of the treaty, Norway has chosen to
establish the fishing zone rather than a full economic
zone. Apart from Norway, Russia is the other major
actor with a significant settlement on Svalbard and
economic activity in the FPZ, never acknowledged by
Russia officially. Nonetheless, despite sporadic tensions based mainly on access to fish resources, Russia
has in practice respected the Norwegian jurisdiction.
Apart from good bilateral relations between these two
countries, strengthened by multilevel cooperation
along a spectrum of areas, a stabilizing factor is that
both states are interested in preserving the status quo
in the region since revision of the archipelago’s legal
regime may throw open Pandora’s Box to other claimants, threatening Russia’s privileged position, as well
as Norway’s jurisdiction in the questioned area.73
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Two other issues in the Arctic concern the legal
status of the NWP and the NSR. Canada considers the
NWP to be internal waters, while the United States
chooses to see the passage as an international strait
and thus subject to the right of transit passage. A similar problem affects the legal status of certain parts of
the NSR. Russia defines the NSR as a national transportation route under Russia’s jurisdiction.74 Navigation through this sailing channel, which must comply
with Russian laws, also includes passage through
straits within and between the four Russian Arctic
archipelagos, Vilkitski, Shokalski, Dmitri Laptev, and
Sannikov. Russia designates the straits as part of its
internal waters, while the United States has explicitly
labeled them as international.75
However, the jurisdictional disputes in the Arctic
are subject to international law, which limits the room
for military conflict.76 The region has a stable legal regime based on principles of international cooperation
to which all five polar states have committed themselves. They have agreed to regulate remaining disagreements within the legal framework and through
negotiations.77 In the case of Russia, the cooperative
and pragmatic approach has been emphasized in its
key documents and political declarations.78 Russia has
repeatedly underlined its belief that the Arctic is not
a zone of potential conflict and that Russia will be a
reliable partner in the region.79
Likewise, the political and economic usefulness of
escalating legal disagreements to a significant interstate war in lieu of pressing for the preferred legal solution seems unlikely. It would involve high political
and material costs likely to outweigh any conceivable
gains by destabilizing the region and making extraction of energy and other economic activities more dif-
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ficult, if possible at all. Such a “solution” is thus likely
to defeat the purpose of operating in the area.
A further consideration is that the Arctic is an environment of extreme operational challenges, even for
armed forces with long-standing Arctic experience. As
put by Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff General Walter Natynczyk: “If someone were to invade the Canadian Arctic, my first task would be to rescue them.”80
Dialogue, cooperation, and stability, all necessary to
address new emerging security challenges, may further strengthen the sense of cooperation.81 Simply put,
keeping tension low is mutually profitable for all parties involved, including Russia.
Security assessments, however, must always give a
nod to worst-case scenarios, not just to the most probable outcomes, in order to ensure acceptable results
under all realizable conditions.82 The potential for
conflict in the Arctic, although unlikely today, cannot
be fully ruled out. There is a possibility that disagreement over particular political issues, intertwined with
identity issues and domestic politics, could take on a
more confrontational course, creating serious tensions
and sparking local episodes based, for instance, on access to fish resources, despite the original benign intentions of parties involved.83 The increased strategic
importance of the Arctic and its stronger connection
with global affairs may also render it more vulnerable
to potential spill-over effects from crises or conflicts in
other parts of the world. Any hypothetical conflict in
the region today is more likely to be heated up outside
the region than inside.
For the present, developments in Arctic security
will depend to a high degree on the general, overarching framework formed by Russia’s relations with the
United States and NATO and, in the future, with other
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possible major stakeholders in the region, such as the
Asian countries.
SECURITY DYNAMICS AND THE RUSSIA
FACTOR
While an armed confrontation in the Arctic appears unlikely in the current political and economic
constellation, the physical transformation of the region and potential future surge in human activities
will call for capabilities to assure safety and security of
the various operations. Extreme climatic conditions at
high latitudes represent a serious challenge to vessels
as well as to offshore infrastructure. Natural disasters
and technological accidents, including oil spills, are
likely to represent significant threats to the vulnerable
Arctic natural environment and human life. In the
harsh Arctic conditions, the military may be the only
institution that possesses the necessary resources and
is capable of providing safety and security on behalf
of the various activities and operations.84
Therefore, along with a stronger presence of coast
guards, border guards, and similar agencies, we may
observe an expanding presence of naval forces as the
economic activities improve. Nevertheless, as in the
case of Arctic energy extraction and transpolar shipping, this scenario belongs to the future. As estimated
by U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary
Roughead, routine military presence in the Arctic is
not expected before 2025.85
However, an increasing military presence in the region, even if not intended primarily for power projection, is a sensitive issue. Despite the pragmatism and
ongoing cooperation in the Arctic region, mistrust—
the Cold War’s legacy—is not entirely gone and may
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be easy to fuel. On various occasions, Russian political
and military authorities have touched on the prevailing sense of insecurity vis-à-vis other actors’ military
presence in the region, particularly that of the United
States and NATO, which are traditionally seen as potential adversaries of Russia and suspected of having
anti-Russian strategic agendas.86 A strengthening military presence by the individual Arctic littoral states,
all members of NATO, may be viewed instead as an
Alliance initiative in the region and thus considered to
be a security problem. This suspicion has been repeatedly voiced by Russia’s authorities.87
One of the main concerns in Russian security and
defense considerations has been the emergence of
stronger military powers on the country’s borders, the
Arctic included. In the preliminary Russian assessments of the transformation of the Arctic as a theater
of maritime operations, the emphasis has been on
challenges rather than opportunities deriving from
it. During the Cold War, the Arctic Ocean was considered an operational front primarily for launching
and flight routes of nuclear missiles. Surface vessel
deployment by both the United States and the Soviet
Union in the Arctic Ocean was difficult because of ice
cover and was thus limited. But the expected opening
of the Arctic may increase the inclination of foreign
naval elements toward Arctic deployments.88
There has been concern in Russia that such a scenario may negatively affect the country’s security,
with a strengthened naval presence and power projection by other states in the polar maritime zone close
to Russian borders.89 Representatives of the Russian
military and administration have expressed their dissatisfaction with the international focus on “hard” security in the region and warned against “attempts of
the region’s militarisation.”90
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Russia plays an important role in the strategies
and policies of all the other Arctic actors. As argued
above, much of the interest in the Arctic has been
generated by Russia’s increased military activity in
the region, initially combined with an assertive antiWestern rhetoric. In 2007 there were more flights by
Russian Long Range Aviation (LRA) than in the entire period from 1991 to 2006. The number of flights
slightly increased in 2008 and has continued since at
the same level. The economic crisis has thus not affected the military activity, unless it was planned to be
boosted further. Air activity, exercised mainly by strategic bombers and support aircraft along the western,
northern, and eastern routes into the North Atlantic,
Arctic, and Pacific Oceans, has rehearsed basically the
same missions as during the Cold War.
Russian naval activity has also been on the rise, including several high-profile naval exercises and more
patrols by strategic and attack submarines. The exercises and maneuvers show that the Russian armed
forces in the High North91 are today better prepared to
participate in more complex air and maritime operations than a few years ago. Nevertheless, the increased
military activity is impressive only if compared to the
long period of stagnation and decay in the Russian
armed forces after the collapse of the Soviet Union
and is far below the average Cold War levels.
Many commentators and experts have interpreted
Russia’s intensified military presence as an expression of the country’s Arctic ambitions. However, the
increased activity has been primarily a part of Russia’s
broader military strategy, often transiting the Arctic
air and maritime domains, but in most cases not directed explicitly at them.

112

Despite the near collapse of important sectors of
the Russian military since the 1990s, the Arctic has
maintained a prominent place in Russia’s strategic
military thinking, in particular in the country’s deterrence strategy as an important basing and operational
area for the sea-based nuclear forces deployed with
the Northern Fleet. The nuclear deterrent is still a key
element of Russian defense policy, essential to uphold
the country’s great power status by compensating for
the country’s weakness in conventional forces. For
those reasons, maintaining and upgrading the nuclear
capabilities have been given the highest priority in
military modernization efforts.
The Northern Fleet has been based in the region
due to a number of conditions that make the area wellsuited to strategic naval operations. Among them are
direct and easy access to the Atlantic Ocean and the
Arctic, manageable ice conditions, and close proximity to potential targets. There is also a range of important elements of defense industry and infrastructure,
such as shipyards, intelligence installations, and the
Plesetsk Cosmodrome launch site for military satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles. The military relevance of the High North has been strengthened by the geopolitical changes after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union, which limited Russia’s access to
the Baltic and the Black Seas.92
Apart from the LRA, Russia’s strategic nuclear
submarines (SSBN) are another essential part of the
nuclear triad. Russia has almost completed modernization of the older nuclear component, the six Delta
IV class submarines deployed with the Northern Fleet,
in addition to the Typhoon class SSBN, currently used
as a platform for testing the new generation missile,
the Bulava.93 The focus on maintaining nuclear strike
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capability has been expressed in the priority given
to building three fourth-generation Borei (Dolgoruky)
class submarines. Russia faces serious challenges in
developing the new missile and is struggling with
delays in the construction. These problems make the
announced plan of building eight Borei submarines by
2015 too optimistic.94 However, the leadership is determined to continue work on the project, since there is
no alternative to it.95
Russia’s highly publicized plans to significantly
strengthen naval assets capable of global reach are
partly an expression of the country’s foreign policy
ambitions as driven by a vision of its rightful place
among what has been perceived as a few independent
centers of power and influence in global affairs. These
plans have not been directly connected with developments in the Arctic, although their implementation
will have an impact on the regional strategic environment there. As in many aspects of Russia’s policies, however, there is a wide gap between ambitions
and realities. The naval buildup will be limited by
economic constraints as well as structural problems
within the Russian military-industrial complex, and
its success depends on the leadership’s ability to turn
the widely publicized economic modernization program into reality.
Russia’s leadership underlines the necessity to
maintain a credible military force in the North, capable of providing security under various scenarios
touching the military and political situation in the region.96 Particular challenges are related to surveillance
and protection of the nearly 20,000 kilometer Russian
state border along the ice-reduced Arctic Ocean.97 According to the Arctic policy statement, the economic
development and potential increased human activity
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will require reinforcements of the FSB border guard
units. The growing importance of activities in the Arctic of Russia, as well as the increasing interest of other
players, may be generating new tasks and thus new
driving forces for the various security structures in the
region, including the Russian Navy. As economic activities take off, we may expect further increases.
CONCLUSIONS
The Arctic remains one of the most peaceful regions
on the world map, as well as one of Russia’s most stable borderlands. Simultaneously, it is a resource-rich
region with the potential to become a new strategically
important channel of maritime communications. The
commercial viability of the Arctic and potential sharp
increase in economic activities are, however, a rather
long-term eventuality and will depend on a number
of factors. Nevertheless, despite the existing uncertainties, the Arctic potential alone continues to attract
the attention of many key players, inciting them to respond to the evolving policies of each other.
Much of the focus on the Arctic worldwide has
been generated by alarming expectations with regard
to how churlish the major actors can behave when
presented with such extraordinary economic opportunities. Although the unresolved jurisdictional issues
involve some degree of uncertainty, the likelihood of
use of military force is not very strong, even if certain scenarios, including escalation of an unintended
incident under “perfect storm” conditions, cannot be
fully discounted. While much of the alarmist rhetoric
lacks a foundation in reality, there is still the risk of increased tensions in interstate relations deriving from
the coexisting diverging interests. The military pres-
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ence of various actors in the Arctic, a prospect that
may be enhanced by climatic warming, may be one of
such problematic issues. Transparency, inclusiveness,
and dialogue will be needed in order to manage these
developments without provoking mutual suspicions
of the parties’ motives and escalation of mutual fears.
Russia holds the key to political development in
the region. The Arctic, particularly the High North, is
of strong economic and military significance to Russia.
The country’s geopolitical position gives it a unique
potential to influence many of the economic activities
in the Arctic in the future, particularly regarding energy extraction and maritime transport along the NSR.
At the same time, Russia is the strongest military power in the Arctic. The region plays an important role in
the country’s broader military strategy, particularly in
nuclear deterrence, and is thus likely to remain of high
importance to Russia in the foreseeable future.
The near complete dependence of the Russian
economy on oil and gas is one the main driving forces
for Russia’s stronger engagement in the region. However, the ambitious economic development plan envisaging a variety of commercial and industrial initiatives has been suffering from the effects of the global
crisis, unfavorable dynamics on energy markets, and
structural problems within the Russian economy.
As recent developments have shown, the economic
slump may strengthen pragmatism, cooperation, and
incentives for liberalization in some areas of Russia’s
economic and foreign policies.98 Nonetheless, at this
stage of development of the country’s economic and
political houses, there is still a degree of uncertainty
about Russia’s possible future choices and thus its viability as a reliable partner. International cooperation
in the Arctic at all levels can contribute to a reduction
of this questioning.
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The uncertainty about the direction in which developments in the Arctic will unfold and, as a result,
about the precise nature of the challenges and threats
deriving from it, justifies the increased attention of
the international community toward the region. The
unlikelihood that an economic boom and, in consequence, a sharp increase in government and business
activity in the Arctic will occur in the immediate or
near-term future gives the actors time to limit risks
and do the necessary contingency planning to ensure
tolerable outcomes. To meet requirements for operations in the Arctic, it will be necessary to enhance situational awareness, improve climatic forecasting, and
conduct comprehensive mapping surveys, as well as
to develop expertise in search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. Cooperation in
meeting these challenges, while mitigating immediate
conflicts of interests, can be the best way to strengthen existing and foster new patterns of international
teamwork because it facilitates a common approach
to security challenges in the region.99 International cooperation, primarily regional, may not only be desirable, but, indeed, it may be the sole option in meeting
challenges emerging in the vast and evolving Arctic
security environment, with its still many unforeseen
scenarios and consequences.
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